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ABSTRACT
Since Nowak & May’s (1992) influential paper, network reciprocity—the fact that local interactions allow unconditional cooperators
to self-organize into clusters—was proposed as the simplest mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in biological and
socio-economic systems. It has been confirmed in several theoretical models and shown to predict the fixation of cooperation
under a simple rule: the benefit of a single altruistic act must outweigh the cost of cooperating with all neighbors. The
experimental evidence among humans is however controversial. The reason is that, while models assume that individuals
update strategy by imitating better performing neighbors, experiments showed that humans are more prone to reciprocate
cooperation than to compare payoffs. Motivated by the empirical results, we rethink network reciprocity as a rational form of
direct reciprocity on networks, indeed made possible by the locality of interactions. Imitating a better performing neighbor
is irrational in networks far from all-to-all, as it can well cause a payoff loss. Instead, we base strategy update on a model
prediction among two options: conditional—reciprocal—cooperation and unconditional defection in a networked prisoner’s
dilemma. We show that both reciprocity and a multi-step predictive horizon are necessary to sustain cooperation, as well as
sufficient for its fixation in any network, provided the game benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than a measure of network’s connectivity.
We hence rediscover the same simple rule—experimentally validated—underpinned however with a different evolutionary
mechanism.
Introduction
Cooperation among rational—self-interested—agents is a longstanding and still debated puzzle in biology and social sciences,
with countless contributions since Axelrod, Hamilton, and Trivers’ seminal works,1, 2 and the topic received recent attention
also in several fields of engineering.3
The standard modeling framework is evolutionary game theory (EGT),4 in which a non-cooperative game—where any
altruistic act is self-enforcing—describes a repeated interaction among pairs (or larger groups) of individuals, a given set of
strategies is confronted, and an evolutionary process links the obtained payoffs to reproduction and death in biology or to
strategy-update in socio-economic systems. The paradigmatic game used to study the evolution of cooperation is the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD)—the two-player-two-option interaction in which a cooperator (option C) provides a benefit b to the opponent at
a cost c<b to herself, whereas a defector (option D) provides no benefit at no cost. The benefit-to-cost ratio, or game return
r = b/c, is often used to parameterize the game (taking c = 1 as monetary unit).
To test whether a cooperative strategy (strategy C) has any chance to evolve, it is confronted with the benchmark strategy
‘unconditional defection’ (strategy D, played by individuals who always defect) under one or a few evolutionary processes.
The three different issues to be discussed are the invasion of the strategy—the spreading of cooperators (C-strategists) in a
population dominated by defectors (D-strategists)—its persistence—the long-term presence, fluctuating or not, of C’s—and its
fixation—the convergence to the state all-C. For example, it is well known that when the PD is played in large and well-mixed—
unstructured—populations, there is no hope for the strategy ‘unconditional cooperation’ (played by individuals who always
cooperate). Defecting gives the largest payoff regardless of what the others are doing, so that, without any specific incentive to
cooperation, C’s cannot invade under any reasonable evolutionary process and disappear if initially present in the population.
Compared to other social dilemmas, the PD is the worst-case scenario for the evolution of cooperation.
Traditional incentivizing mechanisms5 either make cooperation conditional—such as reciprocal altruism1, 2 (also known as
direct reciprocity), the establishment of reputations6 (also known as indirect reciprocity), and mechanisms of kin7 or group
selection8 (or other forms of assortment9, 10)—or change the rules of the game, as by introducing volunteering (optional
participation)11 and punishment of antisocial behaviors.12, 13 All these mechanisms add degrees of strategical complexity, either
in terms of players’ cognitive abilities and/or information flows, or due to extra options in the underlying game.
Starting with Nowak and coauthors’ influential papers,14–16 the fact that interactions in real populations are structured
according to the individuals’ personal contacts has been proposed as the simplest mechanism—requiring no strategical
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complexity—to explain cooperation. It has been named network reciprocity, because in a static (SI note 1) and sparse (far from
complete) network, unconditional C’s can do better than unconditional D’s by grouping into clusters, i.e., the network’s structure
allows C’s to reciprocate (Fig. 1). More specifically, in large regular networks—each node having degree k; k neighbors—driven
by an imitation-like evolutionary process—individuals imitate from time-to-time a better performing neighbor (SI note 2)—and
in the limit of weak selection—the game payoff marginally impacting the individual performance (SI note 3)—unconditional
C’s can invade and fixate under a simple condition:16 the game return r must exceed the connectivity k. That is, if r > k in the
above setting, the probability that cooperation invades and fixates starting from a single C placed in a random position—the
fixation probability—is larger than 1/N—the fixation probability under a totally random process of strategy update, N being
the network’s size. And the rule has been generalized to non-regular networks,17, 18 essentially requiring r to exceed the average
degree 〈k〉.
As several authors did in the last decade,19–23 we question network reciprocity as a mechanism supporting cooperation
in socio-economic networks. In particular, we question the rationale behind the imitation process of strategy update. Why
should we copy a better performing neighbor whose neighborhood might be considerably different—in size as well as in
composition—from ours? Especially in heterogeneous networks, imitation may turn counterproductive (see Fig. 1, where
individual j reduces her payoff by copying i). Recent experiments on (impressively large) human networks playing a PD19, 20
indeed showed that we are more prone to reciprocate cooperation than to compare payoffs. Specifically, the probability to
cooperate (as a rule of the experiment, the same game option, C or D, is taken toward all neighbors) is conditioned by the
player’s previous choice, i.e., by the player’s cooperative or defective ‘mood.’21, 23 In the C mood, a player is willing to
cooperate the more cooperation she observed in the previous game round, even though the neighbors’ previous payoffs were
made available; in the D mood, defection is rather unconditional (or weakly correlated with the previous level of cooperation).
Nonetheless, the simple rule of network reciprocity, r > 〈k〉, found empirical validation.24, 25
Motivated by the empirical findings, we rethink the role of the population structure. In the C mood, players showed a form
of direct reciprocity,1, 2 i.e., higher chance to cooperate with neighbors who showed altruism in past interactions. As all forms
of reciprocity, it requires repeated interactions with the same individuals as well as cognitive abilities to recognize individuals
and remember past interactions. This is exactly the environment provided by a static and sparse network. In particular, it is the
locality of interactions that makes cognitive tasks possible, as the required resources—in terms of memory and abilities—scale
with the player’s neighborhood. At the same time, a local interaction opens the way to more complex rules of strategy update,
not only based on past interactions, but also on foreseeing future ones. We theoretically test reciprocal cooperation against
the benchmark ‘unconditional defection’ under a rational process of strategy update, based on a model prediction of their
future income. Reciprocity is implemented by allowing C’s to selectively abstain from playing for a few game rounds with
exploiting neighbors.11, 26, 27 So doing, C’s reduce exploitation risks—with respect to unconditional C’s—and, at the same time,
communicate their mood, thus increasing their chances to reciprocate cooperation in future interactions. We name this new
mechanism for the social evolution of cooperation networked rational reciprocity.
Our main result is that, under a rule qualitatively similar to r > 〈k〉, networked rational reciprocity grants the fixation of
cooperation starting from any cluster of two C’s. The more interactions are local (the sparser is the network), the lower is the
required return r. And even starting from a single C the fixation probability remains high the more connected is the initial C,
highlighting the role of the network’s structure. We hence rediscover the simple rule of network reciprocity, but we provide a
different underlying explanation, more in line with the observed social behavior.
Results
Model description
Before presenting results, we introduce our model (implementation details are given in the Methods section; the elements
of novelty are commented in the Discussion). We consider two strategies, a reciprocating form of conditional cooperation
(strategy C) and unconditional defection (strategy D). At each game round, each individual is a C- or a D-strategist, the strategy
representing the individual’s mood. A PD is played by all pairs of connected individuals. The individual payoff in the round is
the sum of the outcomes of the PD interactions in the neighborhood. After each round, each individual revises her strategy
with a probability δ assumed small and uniform across the population; parameter δ measures the rate (per game round) of
(asynchronous) strategy update, and 1/δ is the average number of rounds between two consecutive revisions by the same
individual, a sort of ‘inertia’ to change.
In each PD interaction, a C can selectively opt for cooperation or abstention; specifically, she stops playing with an
exploiting neighbor for a number of rounds drawn in accordance with the probability that the exploiter revises her strategy
just after. D’s always play and defect. Our conditional C-strategy implements a form of direct reciprocity. As in the famous
tit-for-tat strategy, C’s cooperate with neighbors who showed cooperation in the previous round. However, they do not retaliate
for defection; rather, they abstain from playing, communicating their mood to the opponent; moreover, they forgive defection or,
better, they poll previous exploiters to seek for cooperation. To modulate reciprocity in the population, the length of abstention
periods is drawn according to a reciprocity-biased rate of strategy update
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Figure 1. Network reciprocity in homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. (a) A cluster of 4 C’s surrounded by D’s in a
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The payoff (per game round, obtained by each individual by playing a PD
with all neighbors and summing up outcomes) of C’s is 2r− 4; that of the D’s at the border of the cluster is r. C’s do better
than D’s if r > 4 and the payoff of a D copying a C (e.g., j copying i) drops to r− 4. (b) A cluster of ki C’s protected from k j
D’s (ki,k j > 2; ki and k j are the degrees of nodes i and j). The payoff of the C-individual i is pii = r(ki− 1)− ki; that of the
D-individual j is pi j = r; pii > pi j if r > 1+ 2/(ki−2) and j drastically reduces her payoff when copying i. Under imitation
update and pii > pi j, j alternates between C (when selecting i for comparison) and D (when selecting a D-neighbor); the other
nodes do not change strategy.
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δε = (1− ε)δ ∈ (0,1), (1)
where parameter ε , also assumed small and uniform across the population, measures reciprocity; super/sub reciprocating C’s
(ε ≷ 0) wait longer/shorter, on average w.r.t. normally reciprocating ones (ε = 0), to go back playing.
When revising strategy, an individual computes her expected accumulated payoff behaving as C or D during an horizon of h
future interactions and decides for the more profitable strategy until the next update. The prediction is based on the model
society here described that is assumed to be public knowledge. We consider the minimal-information scenario, in which
individuals have no access to neighbors’ payoffs and connectivity and infer the neighbors’ strategies only from past interactions.
Consequently, the model prediction cannot account for the concomitant changes in the neighbors’ strategies. This limits the
horizon to a few rounds under a relatively slow strategy update (small δ ). Because of the short horizon, no discount of future
incomes is adopted.
The model parameters and their numerical values used in the analysis are summarized in Table S3.
Analytical results
To gain insight in the system’s dynamics, we preliminary consider an infinite predictive horizon, because it allows a simpler
analysis. We prove (in SI Sects. S1–S6) that when a C-player with degree k and kC C-neighbors (known from past interactions)
revises her strategy according to an infinite horizon, she remains C (no expected gain in changing to D) if
r > 1+
k
kC
P∞CD
1−P∞CD
, P∞CD =
1
2
√
4δε −3δ 2ε −δε
1−δε ≈
√
δε for small δε , (2)
where P∞CD is the probability (computed in Sect. S2) that a C-player who remains C forever will get exploited by a D-neighbor
who remains D forever in a far-future interaction. Similarly, under the same condition (2), the D-to-C strategy change occurs
(positive expected gain in changing to C) according to an infinite predictive horizon.
With a finite horizon of h≥ 1 future interactions, the conditions governing strategy update are more complex (see Sects. S4
and S5, where the expected gains ∆pihC and ∆pi
h
D respectively predicted by a C and a D for a strategy change are computed).
Given a C and a D with identical neighborhoods, the r-threshold for C to remain C and that for D to change to C are different.
Typically, the former is lower, as the C-neighbors of a C are more prone to play in the near future (see Sect. S8). Not surprisingly,
for h = 1 (best-response update28) we have ∆pi1C > 0 and ∆pi
1
D < 0, i.e., defecting assures the highest payoff independently of
the network’s structure. Moreover, under a condition on r more restrictive than (2) (derived in Sect. S7), the predicted payoff
gains ∆pihC and ∆pi
h
D are h-monotonic, respectively decreasing and increasing to the negative and positive infinite-horizon limits.
For intermediate r, ∆pihC (resp. ∆pi
h
D) first increases (decreases) with h up to a positive (negative) extremum, then decreases
(increases) to the negative (positive) infinite-horizon limit. Finally, we show (Sect. S7) that the effect on ∆pihC (resp. ∆pi
h
D) of
adding one prediction step can be made arbitrarily negative (positive) by a sufficiently large r.
Despite the system’s complexity, the above results have straightforward consequences.
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(i) The state all-C is invariant under a weak requirement on r (condition (2) with kC = k; recall that ε and δ are small).
(ii) The state all-D is invariant (condition (2) with kC = 0), though a coordinated switch to C by a small cluster of players
can give a payoff gain.
(iii) Isolated C’s (kC = 0) change to D as soon as they revise their strategy. This does not mean that cooperation cannot start
from isolated individuals, since D-neighbors could change to C before the isolated C changes to D.
(iv) Indeed, a D player connected to a single C (kC = 1) can change to C, provided the game return r is sufficiently large.
(v) Direct reciprocity (ε > εmin =−(1−δ )/δ , so that δε < 1) is essential for the evolution of cooperation, otherwise P∞CD = 1
in (2) and D is the well-known best option. Normal or super reciprocity (ε ≥ 0) further helps cooperation.
(vi) A multi-step predictive horizon (h≥ 2) is essential for cooperation (see the above discussion on ∆pi1C and ∆pi1D).
(vii) The inertia to change also helps cooperation, in the sense that a lower rate δ of strategy update reflects in longer C’s
abstentions and hence in a lower P∞CD in (2).
(viii) Main result: with both reciprocity and multi-step horizon, given all other details, there is a threshold rhC on r above which
cooperation fixates starting from any cluster of (at least two) C’s. An upper bound to rhC is obtained by considering the
most connected node with one C-neighbor (Sect. S8).
(ix) The previous result probabilistically holds also starting from an isolated C, provided her degree k is not too small. With
r > rhC, the probability that a D-neighbor changes to C before the isolated C changes to D goes as 1−1/(k+1) for small
δ (Sect. S9).
(x) Increasing the horizon h always reduces rhC (Sect. S8).
(xi) According to condition (2), cooperation seems to be favored in homogeneous sparse networks (low largest degree)
compared to heterogeneous and/or dense ones. This is evident at low levels of cooperation, at which adding links to a
node is not likely to increase the number of its C-neighbors, thus increasing the ratio k/kC.
(xii) In the complete network—to be used as benchmark since direct reciprocity is there unfeasible—the threshold rhC is
maximal.
(xiii) The role of network’s structure: the comment at point (ix) and two simple examples in Fig. 2 suggest that degree
heterogeneity helps cooperation only if C’s initially occupy the network’s hubs. Essentially, low-degree D’s connected
to a C change to C under a mild requirement on r (low ratio k/kC in (2)). However, to have many low-degree D’s
connected to few initial C’s, we need high-connected C’s. Hence, especially starting at low levels of cooperation, degree
heterogeneity and the placement of the initial C’s in the network’s hubs together reduce the required r to evolve to all-C.
Compared to imitation update (in which C-hubs need a significant fraction of C-neighbors to persist), our rational process
of strategy update allows the formation of C-clusters even starting from isolated C-hubs, who pay (or better invest in) the
initial cost of exploitation. If however most of the hubs are D’s, network heterogeneity turns harmful to cooperation (see
point (xi)).
Numerical results
To quantify the analytical results, we have run many numerical simulations on several networks of N = 1000 nodes: ring and
planar lattices, single-scale (Watts-Strogatz model with full rewiring) and scale-free (Baraba´si-Albert model) random networks,
and the complete network. The results for 1% initial fraction of (normally reciprocating, ε = 0) C’s on planar 4- and 8-neighbor
lattices and on random networks with average degree 〈k〉= 4 and 8 are reported in Fig. 3. See SI Fig. S1 for 50% initial C’s
and Fig. S2 for a degree-4 ring lattice (a ring of nodes each connected to the 4 nearest nodes in the loop) and the complete
network; see also Fig. S3 for different values of the parameters ε and δ . For random networks, we have separately simulated
the random placement of the initial C’s and the placement according to degree-ranking.
The simulations confirm that networked rational reciprocity allows cooperation to invade, persist, and fixate in any network,
provided the game return r is large enough. For any combination of network structure, initialization, and model parameters, the
simulations starting from 1% initial C’s show two thresholds on r: an rhC,min above which, on average, cooperation invades and
persists; and an rhC,max above which cooperation always invades and fixates. For r in between r
h
C,min and r
h
C,max, the average
asymptotic fraction of C’s (solid lines) is not representative of the level of cooperation one should expect in a single simulation
(dots), as cooperation disappears/fixates in most of the cases (see dots at fractions 0 and 1) and typically settles at low C-levels
(below 20%) in the rest of the cases. A deeper analysis of the simulations of Fig. 3 not ended in all-C or all-D (the dots in the
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Figure 2. Networked rational reciprocity in homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. Consider (a) the ring (k = 2 for all
nodes) and b the star network (〈k〉 ≈ 2 for large N) in the infinite-horizon limit. The ring-r∞C is given by (2) with k/kC = 2 and
a single D drives the population to all-D if r < r∞C . The star-r∞C is much higher, because the ratio k/kC peaks at N− 1 for the
central node with only one C-neighbor. However, if the central node is a C, the D-leaves will change to C under the weakest
requirement on r (k/kC = 1 in (2)) and there are high chances that this occurs before the central node revises her strategy.
(The probability that a D-leaf revises before the central node is given by the formula at point (ix), in which k is replaced by
the number of D-leaves.) If the number kC of C-leaves raises to satisfy condition (2), the population then evolves to all-C,
and this occurs with probability higher than 1/2 starting with no C-leaves and r equal to the ring-r∞C (the probability goes as
1/2+ 1/(2N) for small δ , see Sect. S9). That is, on average, the isolated central C drives the star to all-C under a milder
condition on r w.r.t. the ring with some initial D’s.
Note that the threshold rhC,max is much smaller than the theoretical rhC discussed at point (viii) of the Analytical results (see
the average 〈r¯hC〉 over the simulations of a given type in Fig. 3, where r¯hC is the upper bound to rhC derived in Sect. S8). This
is due to the stochastic effect described at point (ix). Essentially, even if some of the C’s initially need a higher r to remain
C, by the time they revise their strategy the r-gap could have vanished because of D-to-C changes in the neighborhood. This
overcompensates the opposite effect due to the fact that rhC is computed starting from a cluster of two C’s, whereas initial
C’s are most often isolated (except for scale-free networks with degree-rank-C-placement, because hubs are likely connected
among themselves; see the average % for each panel in Fig. 3). Starting with random pairs of connected initial C’s indeed
results in lower rhC,min and rhC,max (Fig. S4).
As expected from the arguments at points (x) and (xi), the thresholds rhC,min and rhC,max decrease with the horizon h and
increase with the network’s average degree, given all other details (Fig. 3: compare the different colors within each panel and
left vs right panels). Note that the effects are weakened (as expected) starting from higher initial C-levels (see Fig. S1).
Degree heterogeneity also works as theoretically predicted. Placing the initial C’s in the network’s hubs does favor co-
operation, both in terms of invasion and fixation (Fig. 3: compare single-scale and scale-free networks under degree-rank-C-
placement and note the lower rhC,min and rhC,max in scale-free networks; also note that the type of placement is irrelevant for
single-scale networks). The effect is however moderate. Degree heterogeneity works against the fixation of cooperation under
random placement (Fig. 3: compare single-scale and scale-free networks and note the significantly higher rhC,max in the latters;
rhC,min is slightly lower, because of the larger number of low-connected D’s connected to the initial C’s, who change to C under
mild returns). The effects are again weakened starting from higher initial C-levels (see Fig. S1).
Discussion
We have questioned network reciprocity as a mechanism supporting cooperation in socio-economic networks. The imitation
processes used for strategy update in all theoretical models lack sense when interaction patterns are local and/or heterogeneous,
and the interest for unconditional cooperation disappears under any rational strategy update. Imitation indeed did not emerge
in social experiments.19,20,24,25,31–34 What did emerge19–21,23 is a mood to be C or D and a form of direct reciprocity1,2
in the C mood—the tendency to cooperate with subjects who showed cooperation in past interactions. Nevertheless, the
network plays a fundamental role in making cooperation possible. Static and sparse networks indeed make direct reciprocity
feasible, granting repeated interactions within same groups of individuals and limiting the required cognitive abilities. We
have theoretically shown that these are the networks in which a simple form of direct reciprocity, driven by a rational strategy
update, more easily allows cooperation to invade and reach fixation.
Aims and novelty of the model
Our primary motivation was not to model the human behavior observed in the available experiments, but rather to test a
specific hypothesis: Whether a form of direct reciprocity could evolve on networks (invasion and fixation) under a process of
strategy update that rationally pursues the individual’s interest. We named this EGT scenario networked rational reciprocity,
of which our model is a minimal benchmark version. Minimal in two respects: the number of confronted strategies—two,
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as , see Sect. S9). That is, on average, the isolated central C drives the star to all-C under a milder
condition on r w.r.t the ring with some initial D’s.
open interval (0,1)) indeed reveals that most of dots above 0.2 denote simulations that converge to all-C on a longer timescale,
whereas dots below 0.2 typically represents simulations ending in a nontrivial stalemate—different from all-C and all-D—or
showing long-term fluctuations (see SI Sect. S12 for further details and Sect. S10 for examples of nontrivial stalemates and
fluctuations in the simple network of Fig. 1b).
Note that the threshold rhC,max is much smaller than the theoretical r
h
C discussed at point (viii) of the Analytical results (see
the average 〈r¯hC〉 over the simulations of a given type in Fig. 3, where r¯hC is the upper bound to rhC derived in Sect. S8). This
is due to the stochastic effect described at point (ix). Essentially, even if some of the C’s initially need a higher r to remain
C, by the time they revise their strategy the r-gap could have vanished because of D-to-C changes in the neighborhood. This
overcompensates the opposite effect due to the fact that rhC is computed starting fro a cluster of two C’s, whereas initial C’s are
most often isolated (except for scale-free networks with degree-rank-C-placement, because hubs are likely connected among
themselves; see the average % for each panel in Fig. 3). Starting with random pairs of connected initial C’s indeed results in
lower rhC,min and r
h
C,max (Fig. S4).
As expected from the arguments at points (x) and (xi), the thresholds rhC,mi and r
h
C,max decrease with the horizon h and
increase with the network’s average degree, given all other details (Fig. 3: compare the different colors within each panel and
left vs right panels). Note that the effects are weakened (as expected) starting from higher initial C-levels (see Fig. S1).
Degree heterogeneity also works as theoretically predicted. Placing the initial C’s in the network’s hubs does favor
cooperation, both in terms of invasion and fixation (Fig. 3: compare single-scale and scale-free networks under degree-rank-C-
placement and note the lower rhC,min and r
h
C,max in scale-free networks; also note that the type of placement is irrelevant for
single-scale networks). The effect is however moderate. Degree heterogeneity works against the fixation of cooperation under
random placement (Fig. 3: compare single-scale and scale-free networks and note the significantly higher rhC,max in the latters;
rhC,min is slightly l wer, because of the larger number of low-connected D’s connected to the initial C’s, who change to C under
mild returns). The effects are again weakened starting from higher initial C-levels (see Fig. S1).
Discussion
We have questioned network reciprocity as a mechanism supporting cooperation in socio-economic networks. The imitation
processes used for strategy update in all theoretical models lack sense when interaction patterns are local and/or heterogeneous,
and the interest for unconditional cooperation disappears under any rational strategy update. Imitation indeed did not emerge in
social experiments.19, 20, 24, 25, 31–34 What did emerge19–21, 23 is a mood to be C or D and a form of direct reciprocity1, 2 in the C
mood—the tendency to cooperate with subjects who showed cooperation in past interactions. Nevertheless, the network plays a
fundamental role in making cooperation possible. Static and sparse networks indeed make direct reciprocity feasible, granting
repeated interactions within same groups of individuals and limiting the required cognitive abilities. We have theoretically
shown that these are the networks in which a simple form of direct reciprocity, driven by a rational strategy update, more easily
allows cooperation to invade and reach fixation.
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Figure 3. Invasion, persistence, and fixation of cooperation under networked rational reciprocity. Panels show the level
of cooperation reached in 104 game rounds starting from 1% inital C’s on different network structures (left: average degree
〈k〉 = 4; right: 〈k〉 = 8) as a function of the PD game return r. Solid lines show the average fraction over 100 random
initializations (random placement of the initial C’s in planar lattices; network generation and random placement of the initial
C’s for random—single scale and scale free—networks; the average % of isolated initial C’s is reported). Dots show the
outcome of single simulations (only for rhC,min < r < rhC,max, i.e., only if some of the outcomes lie in the open interval (0,1));
transparency is used to show dots accumulation. Colors code the predictive horizon h, from 2 to 5, and the corresponding
upper bound 〈r¯hC〉 to the threshold rhC is reported. See Sects. S11 and S12 for further details on networks and numerical
simulations.
strategies C and D—and, especially, the amount of information available to the players—nothing more than what they know
from direct interaction. Benchmark, because of the choices of the PD interaction and the D strategy—unconditional D—both
setting the worst-case scenario for the evolution of cooperation.
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Aims and novelty of the model
Our primary motivation was not to model the human behavior observed in the available experiments, but rather to test a specific
hypothesis: Whether a form of direct reciprocity could evolve on networks (invasion and fixation) under a process of strategy
update that rationally pursues the individual’s interest. We named this EGT scenario networked rational reciprocity, of which
our model is a minimal benchmark version. Minimal in two respects: the number of confronted strategies—two, strategies C
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and D—and, especially, the amount of information available to the players—nothing more than what they know from direct
interaction. Benchmark, because of the choices of the PD interaction and the D strategy—unconditional D—both setting the
worst-case scenario for the evolution of cooperation.
The main novelty of our model is the model-predictive rule for strategy update. Except for best-response update28—
corresponding to our 1-step prediction—the evolution of unconditional C on networks has been always studied with update
rules that implement imitation in socio-economic contexts. Also direct reciprocity has been similarly investigated.35
Other elements are rather standard.36 Individuals repeatedly play in a static network. At each round, each individual is
in the C or D mood21, 23 and accordingly behaves using the C or D strategy. A round consists of a PD interaction among
all pairs of neighbors and payoffs are collected. Strategy update is slow—compared to the frequency of game rounds—and
asynchronous:37 each individual revises what is the best strategy to follow at a rate that is assumed small and uniform across
the population. This is the assumption that makes predictions of short-future incomes possible, by disregarding the neighbors’
updates in the predictive horizon.
The way in which we implement direct reciprocity—allowing C’s to abstain from playing—is also not new. Optional
participation is known to relax social dilemmas when a baseline payoff is granted to loners,11, 26 whereas link disconnection
has been recently considered.27 Our link inhibition is temporary and grants no profit to C’s. We prefer abstention rather than
forcing retaliation—cooperators defecting neighboring exploiters—because this is more connatural to the C mood. Although
there is no difference in a single round (because we assume no payoff for mutual defection), abstaining C’s communicate their
mood to exploiters. This choice is however not crucial for our findings. We expect similar results by confronting unconditional
D with any reciprocating form of conditional cooperation under a rational process of strategy update (e.g., we preliminary
tested the well-known tit-for-tat and forgiving tit-for-tat2).
Direct reciprocity deserves another comment. Originally,1, 2 it has been studied in iterated games, i.e., (non-evolutionary)
games involving only two players (rather than a population of two types of players) who know the probability w > 0 of a next
interaction. In the evolutionary context, there are two ways in which one can study repeated interactions among two given
players in the population. Either the single game round consists of an iterated game between each pair of neighbors—an option
allowing direct reciprocity even in large, dense or highly-dynamic networks, so far investigated in the socio-economic context
under imitation-like update rules35—or one relies on a static, sparse network, as we do. Our game round involves a one-shot,
optional PD interaction with neighbors. The game is however repeated over an indefinite number of rounds in a static network,
so that a next round is essentially always granted. The sparsity of interactions makes direct reciprocity possible, by limiting the
cognitive abilities required to remember neighbors and past interactions. Of course hubs need more resources than leaves, but
this is typically built-in in the socio-economic structure.
From network reciprocity to networked rational reciprocity
Network reciprocity and networked rational reciprocity are substantially different mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation.
Limiting the discussion to socio-economic systems, the former models the competition between unconditional cooperation and
defection under an imitation-like process of strategy update; the latter studies the competition between a reciprocating form of
conditional cooperation and unconditional defection under a rational strategy update. Their common bond is the need of a
population structure, steady and local, to support cooperation. To allow cluster of C’s protected from D’s and to make direct
reciprocity feasible and effective, respectively.
We confirm the fundamental role played by static and sparse networks of contacts in the evolution of cooperation. We
rethink, however, the underlying evolutionary mechanism. Direct reciprocity combined with a farsighted rule of strategy
update—our multi-step predictive horizon—are the keys to explain the success of cooperation. With no reciprocity (or other
mechanisms) supporting cooperation, players should rationally opt for defection; this is well-known in unstructured population,
but it works as well on any structure. Similarly, the myopic optimization of the next game round suggests to defect.
Interestingly, our results are in line with those theoretically obtained for network reciprocity:16–18 there are good chances
that cooperation invades and fixates if the game return r sufficiently exceeds a measure of the network connectivity (see
condition (2) for the case of an infinite predictive horizon; the threshold rhC in Sect. S8 for a finite horizon; also see all our
numerical simulations). Two aspects on which the evolution of cooperation under network reciprocity and networked rational
reciprocity differ are discussed in the following two sections.
The invasion of cooperation
We have shown that if the game return r is large enough, networked rational reciprocity grants high chances of (invasion and)
fixation starting from a single C, i.e., chances of the order 1−1/(k+1)+O(δ ), where k is the degree of the initial C and δ is
the rate of strategy update (see analytical results (viii) and (ix)). This is different from what is granted by network reciprocity
under the rule r > k, i.e., fixation probability larger than 1/N (in large regular networks in the limit of weak selection; 1/N is
the fixation probability under totally random strategy update). When the rule of network reciprocity is weakly satisfied in a
large network, cooperation almost surely disappears starting from a single C (probability 1−1/N). To have higher chances of
fixation, a significantly larger r is typically required and, especially when selection is strong (SI note 3), cooperation cannot
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invade anyhow. Consider, e.g., a single C in the lattice of Fig. 1a. If selection is strong, the C most likely imitates a D-neighbor
as soon as she revises her strategy (probability δ ), whereas D-neighbors do not imitate the C. The probability of invasion—to
go from one to two C’s—is negligible after each game round, whereas the C sooner or later switches to D.
We hence conclude that network reciprocity does not support the invasion of cooperation. Not surprisingly, all theoretical
studies showing significant fixation probabilities for cooperation under intermediate or strong selection considered random
initial conditions with 50% C’s29, 30, 38–51 (33% has been considered in Ref.28). Starting from isolated C’s or small clusters,
cooperation most likely disappear. We have, e.g., tested network reciprocity starting from 1% initial C’s on the same network
structures of Fig. 3, using the pairwise comparison imitation rule under strong selection (the one used in the majority of the
above mentioned works; see SI notes 2 and 3). Cooperation systematically disappeared up to r = 5000, except for scale-free
networks with degree-rank-C-placement (where C-hubs are known to form clusters) in which we found invasion only for r
larger than 20.
The effect of the network structure
A considerable effort has been devoted to identify the network structures that best favor the evolution of cooperation under
network reciprocity.38–41 The general answer is that, for a given (sufficiently small) average degree 〈k〉 and starting from a
significant C-level, heterogeneous networks—e.g., scale-free networks—do better than homogeneous networks—lattices or
single-scale networks. Indeed, a C-hub (individual i with degree ki 〈k〉) with a significant fraction (say 50%) of C-neighbors
is imitated by a low-connected D-neighbor j under a mild requirement on the game return r (pii = (r−1)ki/2− ki, pi j = r for a
leaf j). C-hubs can then build C-clusters, whereas this requires higher returns in homogeneous networks (ki,k j ≈ 〈k〉).
On the contrary, heterogeneity works against cooperation under networked rational reciprocity. From condition (2) (for the
case of an infinite horizon; similarly see the threshold rhC in Sect. S8 for a finite horizon) we see that the threshold on r above
which strategy revising C’s (resp. D’s) remain (resp. change to) C increases with the node degree k. Especially at low levels of
cooperation (low kC), C- or D-hubs (connected to one or a few C’s) require a larger r to opt for C than nodes with degree closer
to average. The simulations in Fig. 3 indeed show that the r-thresholds required for invasion and fixation of cooperation are
higher for scale-free w.r.t. single-scale networks, if the initial C’s are placed at random.
However, C-hubs encourage low-connected D-neighbors in changing to C under mild returns. Provided the rate of strategy
update is small enough, the number of C-neighbors of a C-hub will raise, while the hub pays the cost of building the cluster. In
other words, initially isolated C-hubs invest in the future establishment of cooperation. Moreover, hubs are likely connected
among themselves, so that placing the initial C’s in the network’s hubs forms clusters of C’s that mitigate the investment.
Network heterogeneity therefore turns beneficial to cooperation under this strategic placement of the initial C’s.
Links with social experiments
Four experiments on relatively large (N ≥ 100), static and sparse human networks playing a PD have been performed to
date.19, 20, 24, 25 The two most recent (on ring lattices: N = 100, degree k = 2,4,6;24 N = 225, k = 225) have shown significant
levels of stable cooperation under the rule r > k of network reciprocity (r = 2,4,624 and r = 2;25 significant cooperation was
observed also for r = k), though the consistency of human behavior with the unconditional C and D strategies under imitation
update was not documented. In the first two experiments (on planar lattices: N = 13×13 = 169, k = 8;19 N = 25×25 = 625,
k = 4;20 on a heterogeneous network: N = 604, degree from 2 to 16, 〈k〉= 3.420), the game return r was set below (r = 10/3)
the average connectivity and cooperation dropped at levels comparable to those expected in the complete network (the all-to-all
interaction was mimicked in a control treatment by reshuffling neighbors at each round). Subjects were however documented
not to imitate better performing neighbors. They cooperated by essentially reciprocating the benefit obtained in the previous
round. Moreover, the positive effect predicted by network reciprocity in heterogeneous networks38–41 was missed.20, 21 Because
the experimental setting was very similar in the four experiments—in particular, the same game option, C or D, is taken for all
neighbors at each round—we might expect a similar behavior.
Other experiments have been performed on smaller networks, with results consistent with the four larger experiments. On
small ring lattices (N = 18, k = 4), low/medium levels of cooperation was observed for r = 4,5,31, 32 with subjects reacting
to cooperation in previous rounds rather than to neighbors’ previous payoffs (the payoff per round was however normalized
by the node degree). Small-words and random networks (N = 18, k = 4)31 as well as complete networks (N from 2 to 5)32, 34
showed lower cooperation w.r.t. homogeneous sparse networks. On small square lattices (N = 16, k = 4), low cooperation was
observed for r = 3,33 with an apparently unconditional behavior driven by imitation update, though the cooperative strategy
was later shown more robustly described as conditioned by direct reciprocity under a random strategy update23 (see below).
The identification of the strategy (one or many) adopted (or learned) by humans when playing a PD experiment is a difficult
task and the result is likely to depend on the experimental setting. A few general traits are however apparent from the analysis
of the experiments of Refs. 19, 20, 33 (with similar settings). Apart from subjects who mostly cooperate or defect, that are
always minorities, the analysis revealed that humans behave according to a cooperative or defective mood,21, 23 thus justifying
the modeling assumption of two strategies. In the C mood, subjects more likely cooperate (with all neighbors, as a rule of the
experiment) the more cooperation was observed in the neighborhood in the previous round, i.e., they reciprocate cooperation.
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Subjects in the D mood most likely defect irrespectively of the previous round, i.e. defection is largely unconditional. Strategy
change is identified as a random process biased by the subject’s mood. Precisely, a C/D-player changes strategy after opting for
defection/cooperation at a given round. This shows that subjects did not copied better performing neighbors (though payoff
were made available), but does not unveil what pushes subjects to change strategy. Our basic rational hypothesis is that subjects
try to maximize, at the best of their knowledge, the outcome of one or a few future rounds.
Summarizing, the social experiments show that the C strategy is conditioned by direct reciprocity, that defection is rather
unconditional, and that a rule of the kind r > 〈k〉 essentially works—in the sense of a threshold on r over which cooperation
stabilizes at levels that increase with the game return r. They do not suggest the underlying evolutionary mechanism, but show it
is not network reciprocity. These results provide the motivation and the basis for our model. However, we imagined a different
model society with respect to the one imposed by the experimental setting in Refs.19,20,33. The two major differences concern
the C strategy. We assume that C-players do not defect, rather they can abstain from playing with defecting neighbors; and
the choice is taken independently for each neighbors, instead of forcing a common decision. Assuming a rational process of
strategy update, based on a model prediction of future payoffs, we show that cooperation fixates if the game return r is larger
than a threshold that scales with the average connectivity of the network.
Although our simulations cannot be directly compared with the available experiments, we provide an evolutionary
mechanism that has the potential to explain human cooperation. Our model-predictive rule for strategy update is not an
easy one to apply in real networks, in which the rate of strategy update might be far from uniform across the population.
Moreover, it requires nontrivial cognitive abilities and humans might not be as rational as we assume. However, it could emerge,
approximatively, as the result of an intuitive, rather than computational, human behavior. To test this claim new experiments
must be designed, and our model suggests how. For example, to confirm that humans do have a C or D mood, it is important to
allow them to temporarily abstain from playing with specific neighbors, to avoid confounding risk-avoiding defections with a D
mood. Allowing independent decisions with different neighbors is also important, e.g., to identify a mix of C and D as the
absence of a mood. Allowing independent decisions definitely poses experimental challenges, and it has been recently shown to
enhance cooperation in static networks.52
Methods
When the C-individual i (normally reciprocating, ε = 0) gets exploited by neighbor j, she draws the number a of game rounds
to skip according to the distribution Prob(a) = (1−δ )aδ , a≥ 0 (with mean 1/δ −1), i.e., i goes back playing with j at the
(a+ 1)-th round following the exploitation with the probability that j first revises her strategy after the a-th round (e.g., i
does not stop playing with j, a = 0, with the probability δ that j revises strategy just after exploiting i). Without knowing the
number drawn by i, the probability pi j that i will agree to play with j at the t-th round following exploitation is the cumulative
distribution of Prob(a) from a = 0 to a = t−1, i.e., the probability
pt = 1− (1−δ )t (3)
that the drawn number is smaller than t.
Instead of managing abstention periods, we implement our model by endowing each individual i with the set of probabilities
pi j that i will agree to play with j at the next round, i, j = 1, . . . ,N. Initially, pi j = p ji = 1 if i and j are neighbors; pi j = p ji = 0
otherwise. The N×N matrix P = [pi j] defines the (static) network topology. At each game round, each PD interaction takes
place with probability pi j p ji, i.e., only if both players agree to play. When the C-individual i gets exploited by neighbor j, she
sets pi j = p1 = δ , i.e., to the probability that j revises her strategy just after. If i decides not to play with j at the next round,
pi j is updated to p2 = 1− (1− δ )2, the probability that j had revised strategy by the second round following exploitation.
After t−1 consecutive abstentions, the probability to play at the t-th round is pt in (3), that increases to one with t. When
the C-individual i gets reciprocated by the C-neighbor j, she resets pi j = 1. D’s always have pi j = 1 toward all neighbors.
(Note that either pi j = 1 or p ji = 1 by construction.) We therefore implement a different model, w.r.t. the one so far described,
by shifting the network’s dynamic from the links (on-off) to the links’ weights (the probabilities pi j). The two models are
statistically equivalent and the latter is simpler to analyze (see Supplementary Information).
For super/sub reciprocating C’s (ε ≷ 0), the rate of strategy update δ must be replaced with the biased rate δε in the above
formulas. Recall (from (1)) that ε =−(δε−δ )/δ is the relative mismatch between δ and δε , i.e., the under/over-estimation of δ
adopted by super/sub reciprocating C’s in deciding how long to abstain. For super/sub reciprocating C’s, 1/δε is larger/smaller
than the average number of rounds 1/δ within which the exploiter once revises her strategy, so that, on average, C’s stop
playing with exploiters for longer/shorter than the time taken by the latter to possibly change to C. (C’s stop playing forever if
ε → εmax = 1; they never stop—they play C unconditionally—if ε → εmin =−(1−δ )/δ .)
After each game round, each individual independently decides whether to revise strategy with probability δ . C’s who revise
compute their expected accumulated payoff assuming to remain C, pihCC, or to behave as D, pi
h
CD, in the next h rounds (see
Sect. S4) and change to D if the expected gain ∆pihC = pi
h
CD−pihCC is positive. So doing, they assume the neighbors’ strategy
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unchanged since the last PD interaction that took place, so that D’s who changed to C in the meantime are considered as D’s.
D’s who revise compute their expected accumulated payoff gain ∆pihD = pi
h
DC−pihDD under full information (see Sect. S5) and
change to C under a positive gain. When changing to D, C’s set pi j = 1 toward all neighbors. When changing to C, D’s set
pi j = δε toward D-neighbors, as if drawing an abstention period.
To compute their expected payoff gains ∆pihC and ∆pi
h
D, C’s and D’s evaluate the probabilities to interact with their neighbors
during the predictive horizon. To this end, two probabilities are defined in Sects. S2 and S3 for the C-individual i with pi j = pti j
for some ti j ≥ 0 (p0 = 1 by definition): the probability PtCD(ti j) to play with the D-neighbor j at round t ≥ 1 of the horizon; and,
similarly, the probability PtCC(ti j) to play with the C-neighbor j (with p ji = 1). As t→ ∞, PtCD converges (independently of the
initialization) to the infinite-horizon limit P∞CD of condition (2). Although making prediction assuming no strategy change in the
neighborhood makes sense only for short horizons, relatively to the revision rate δ , players can hardly do better predictions
anyway. In our simulations we have limited the product δh—upper bounding the neighborhood fraction possibly subject to
change within the horizon—to 0.3 (e.g., δ = 0.05 and h≤ 5 in Fig. 3).
For details on networks’ structure and generation and on numerical simulations, see Sects. S11 and S12, respectively.
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Supplementary Notes
1. We focus on static networks. Dynamical networks, where old contacts can be broken and new ones established—
exogenously or in feedback from the game interaction—and whether this favors cooperation is not discussed in this
work.53–56
2. Network reciprocity has been shown to work under several evolutionary processes. These include16, 40 the two imitation
processes traditionally used to describe strategy update in socio-economic networks: Imitation (IM)—an individual is
selected uniformly at random to revise her strategy and stays or copies one of the neighbors’ strategies with probabilities
proportional to her own and the neighbors’ (normalized) fitnesses—and Pairwise Comparison (PC)—a randomly chosen
individual compares payoffs with a random neighbor and stays or copies the neighbor’s strategy proportionally to fitness
difference. Fitness is a measure of performance in the underlying game (in terms of reproduction in biology and status
in socio-economic systems); it can simply be the game payoff in the last round (see note 3). Network reciprocity
best works for the biological process known as Death-Birth (DB)16—a random individual is selected to die and the
neighbors compete for the empty site proportionally to fitness—that is equivalent to a modified IM process where the
selected individual is forced to imitate a neighbor. Interestingly, network reciprocity does not work (the condition
on the game return r is highly demanding18) for the dual biological process of Birth-Death (BD)—an individual is
selected to reproduce proportionally to fitness over the whole population and the offspring replaces a randomly selected
neighbor. Essentially, under BD, D’s at the border of C-clusters reproduce more than bordering C’s. (See Ref. 51 for
other biologically-inspired evolutionary processes, in which selection acts globally or locally on both birth and death
with possibly independent dispersal and interaction graphs.)
3. Weak selection means that the game payoffs contribute to the individual’s fitness only to a small extent. It is an interesting
limit because it simplifies analytic computations. It represents situations in which the individual’s performance is largely
determined by factors that are independent of the game interaction and typically assumed time-invariant. They give a
baseline fitness to all players, to which the game output marginally adds. E.g., in the PC process, the probability that an
individual with low payoff imitates a selected one with high payoff is slightly above 50%; as well, there is a significant
probability, slightly below 50%, to copy individuals with lower payoff. That is, the performance in the game is weakly
selected. Selection is strong when the fitness is totally determined by the game. It can simply be the payoff, or even a
function of the payoff that increases more than linearly, so to increase the probability that a given payoff difference will
result in the selection of the best performance. The strongest selection (extreme selection57) is the case in which the
player with larger payoff is always selected to reproduce or be copied. In our model selection is extreme, in the sense that
when revising strategy individuals always opt for the strategy giving the largest payoff prediction.
4. The transitivity of a network—the average probability that the neighbors of a node are neighbors themselves—is best
known as the network’s clustering.58 We use transitivity to avoid confusion with a C-cluster—a maximal group of
connected C’s.
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Figure S1. Persistence and fixation of cooperation under networked rational reciprocity. The figure complements Fig. 3 by
showing the results obtained starting from 50% initial C’s, all other details unchanged (same model parameters, networks, and
initializations). Note that the thresholds on r identified with 50% initial C’s have a different meaning w.r.t. the significantly
higher rhC,min and rhC,max of Fig. 3. Here cooperation persists (resp. fixates), on average, for r above the lower (resp. higher)
threshold, being however unable to invade (resp. fixate after invasion) if r is below the rhC,min (resp. rhC,max) of Fig. 3. The
effects of the different network structures and initializations observed in Fig. 3 are still present but weakened.
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Figure S2. Networked rational reciprocity on other regular network structures. The figure complements Figs. 3 and S1 by
adding a degree-4 ring lattice and the complete network, starting from 1% (left panels) and 50% (right panels) initial C’s. The
ring behaves similarly to the square lattice, better supporting the invasion of C’s (slightly lower rhC,min for 1% initial C’s). In
the ring lattice, half of the D’s at the boundary of a small C-cluster (those next to a C in the main loop) have 2 D-neighbors,
whereas they typically have 3 D-neighbors in the square lattice, so the that D-to-C strategy changes requires a lower return
at low levels of C. The increased number of simulations not ended in all-C or all-D w.r.t. the square lattice (dots in the open
interval (0,1), especially for 1% initial C’s) is due to the slower convergence, because of the essentially one-dimensional ring
structure. The all-to-all connection is the most demanding structure for the invasion of C’s (note the different scale of the
r-axis in panel c), and even for its fixation starting from 50% initial C’s (compare with Fig. S1). The complete network is in
a stalemate starting from 50% initial C’s with intermediate returns. Stalemate at the initial state is possible on any network
structure (see, e.g., the simple network of Fig. 1b analyzed in Sect. S10), though we observed it in our numerical simulations
only for the complete network. It typically requires significant C-levels, since isolated C’s are willing to change, though we
observed it also at 1% initial C’s for r slightly larger than rhC,min. (See Sect. S12 for more details on the numerical results.)
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Figure S3. Sensitivity analysis. The figure complements Fig. 3 by reproducing the simulations with average degree 〈k〉 = 4
and predictive horizon h = 3 (red in the left panels of Fig. 3) for two different (larger/smaller) values of the reciprocity
parameter ε (0.5 and −1, halving/doubling the reciprocity-biased rate of strategy update δε (see (1)) w.r.t. the baseline value
in Table S3; left column) and of the rate of strategy update δ (0.1 and 0.025, double/half of the baseline value; right column).
As expected at points (v) and (vii) of the Analytical results, super/sub reciprocation (ε ≷ 0) as well as higher/lower inertia to
change (lower/higher δ ) result in lower/higher thresholds rhC,min and rhC,max.
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Figure S4. Networked rational reciprocity under random pair placement of the initial C’s. The figure complements Fig. 3
by reproducing the simulations with random placement of the initial C’s by randomly selecting pairs of C-neighbors instead
of single individuals. The 10 initial C’s (1% of N = 1000 nodes) are iteratively selected as follows: each time a selected node
has no C-neighbors, the next node is selected among its neighbors; the last node is either selected to pair the previous one, or
among the D’s connected to C’s. Both rhC,min and rhC,max, as well as their gap, get reduced w.r.t. random placement in Fig. 3.
Recall that isolated C’s switch to D at first strategy revision, so that starting with all isolated C’s it is always possible to end in
the trivial stalemate all-D. Note that degree-rank-pair-placement—selecting initial C’s according to degree-ranking by pairing
isolated ones—would have reproduced the results of Fig. 3, as random and degree-rank selections are essentially equivalent
for single-scale networks and degree-rank-C-placement is unlikely to leave isolated C’s in scale-free networks.
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Figure S5. Networked rational reciprocity in scale-free networks with medium-high transitivity. We checked the robustness
of our results with respect to a different type of scale-free network (Holme-Kim model,63 HK) with tunable transitivity (the
average probability that the neighbors of a node are neighbors themselves, see SI note 4), since network transitivity—shown
to favor cooperation under imitation update29,30—vanishes with the size of Baraba´si-Albert networks.62 (See Sect. S11 for
details on the BA and HK algorithms.) The resulting transitivity (average over 100 networks) is 0.74 for average degree
〈k〉 = 4 (left) and 0.28 for 〈k〉 = 8 (right) (respectively 0.027 and 0.037 in Fig. 3; transitivity is known to increases/decrease
with 〈k〉 in BA/HK networks62,63). Although the theoretical degree distribution for large size is the same of a BA network, the
effect of raising transitivity in a finite network is an increase of nodes with low and high degree to the detriment of nodes with
intermediate degree (checked on average on our 100 networks). This ‘finite size effect’ explains our results: slightly lower
rhC,min and higher rhC,max compared with the same panel in Fig. 3. Invasion is indeed favored by the enhanced initial presence
of low-connected D’s, who change to C under mild returns if connected to a C, whereas fixation is hindered by the enhanced
initial presence of D-hubs. The increased number of simulations not ended in all-C or all-D (dots in the open interval (0,1),
essentially in the left panels where transitivity is very high, w.r.t. Fig. 3) can be also explained in terms of the loss of nodes
with intermediate degree. On one hand, the loss makes the evolution slower, possibly forming bottlenecks through which
cooperation must percolate, so that some of the dots at significant C-levels might denote simulations ending in all-C on a
longer timescale. On the other hand, the loss makes nontrivial stalemates and fluctuations more frequent, as D-nodes with
high degree can prevent the convergence to all-C even under degree-rank-C-placement. (See Sect. S12 for more details on the
numerical results.)
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Supplementary Methods
S1 The probability to play pt
After t−1≥ 0 consecutive abstentions following an exploitation by the neighbor j, the probability pi j that the C-individual
i agrees to play with j at the next game round is set to pt = 1− (1− δε)t . It is the probability that j had revised her
strategy at least once ever since the exploitation, according to the reciprocity-biased rate of strategy update δε . (Recall that
δε = (1− ε)δ ∈ (0,1) is equal to, resp. smaller/larger than, the actual rate δ for for normally, resp. super/sub, reciprocating
individuals; ε = 0, resp. ε ≷ 0.)
If the (i, j) interaction takes place at the next round, then i sets pi j to 1 or to p1 = δε depending on whether j cooperates or
defects. Otherwise, i updates pi j to pt+1. Note that pt+1 can be obtained with the recursion
pt+1 = (1−δε)pt +δε , t ≥ 1. (S1)
We set p0 = 1 and, whenever needed in the following, ti j denotes the integer giving pti j = pi j for the neighbor pair (i, j).
S2 The probability of getting exploited PtCD
Starting after a given game round with pi j = pti j for some ti j ≥ 0 (or after initialization with ti j = 0), PtCD(ti j) is the probability
that the C-individual i plays with the D-neighbor j at the t-th future round, assuming no change of strategy. (The ti j-argument,
sometimes omitted in the following, makes initialization explicit.) We therefore have P1CD(ti j) = pti j for t = 1, while for t > 1
we use the recursion
Pt+1CD = P
t
CDδε +(1−PtCD)
(
(1−δε)PtCD+δε
)
= δε +(1−δε)PtCD(1−PtCD). (S2)
That is, if i is exploited by j at round t, she will then play at round t+1 with probability p1 = δε (first term after the first equal
sign in (S2)); otherwise PtCD is updated as pt with the rule (S1) (second term).
Starting with pi j = δε (i.e., ti j = 1), the probabilities pt and PtCD are listed in Table S1 for t ≥ 1 (first and second columns).
Both probabilities have linear (1-st-order) leading δε -term with same coefficient t, i.e., PtCD(ti j)≈ (ti j + t−1)δε for small δε
(up to 1-st-order, only the terms δε and PtCD matter in the right-most side of (S2))
As t→ ∞, PtCD converges (independently of the initialization) to the infinite-horizon limit
P∞CD =
1
2
√
4δε −3δ 2ε −δε
1−δε ≈
√
δε for small δε . (S3)
The limit is reached monotonically if δε < 1/3 (from below if P1CD < P
∞
CD or P
1
CD > 1−P∞CD; from above if P∞CD < P1CD ≤ 1−P∞CD;
see Fig. S6). This condition is met in the numerical analysis, where we use at most δε = 0.1 (corresponding to the perturbation
of Fig. S3 w.r.t. the baseline value δε = 0.05, see Table S3).
S3 The probability to reciprocate PtCC
Starting after a given game round with pi j = pti j for some ti j ≥ 0 (or after initialization with ti j = 0), PtCC(ti j) is the probability
that the C-individual i plays at the t-th future round with the C-neighbor j, assuming no change of strategy. If ti j = 0, then i
and j reciprocated cooperation in the last round, so that PtCC(0) = 1 for all t ≥ 1. Otherwise, i stopped playing after getting
exploited by j who turned C in the meanwhile (so that p ji = 1). In both cases we have P1CC(ti j) = pti j for t = 1, while for t > 1
we use the recursion
Pt+1CC = P
t
CC+(1−PtCC)pti j+t = 1− (1−δε)ti j+t +PtCC(1−δε)ti j+t . (S4)
That is, if i does play at round t, she will certainly play at round t+1 (first term after the first equal sign in (S4)); otherwise PtCC
changes from pti j+t−1 to pti j+t (second term).
Starting with pi j = δε (i.e., ti j = 1), the probability PtCC is listed in Table S1 for t ≥ 1 (third column). The leading δε -term
is linear (1-st-order) and from (S4) it follows that its coefficient in Pt+1CC is ti j + t plus the coefficient in P
t
CC (up to 1-st-order,
only the 1-st-order term of the first power (1−δε)ti j+t and the 0-order term of the second matter in the right-most side of (S4)).
For sufficiently small δε , we hence have
PtCC(ti j)> P
t
CD(ti j) for any ti j ≥ 0 and t > 1. (S5)
The probability PtCC monotonically increases to 1 (independently of ti j).
We now show that inequality (S5) holds true for any δε ∈ (0,1). From the first right-hand side in (S4) (time-shifted from
t−1 to t), we see that PtCC(ti j) is an interior convex combination (by construction 0 < Pt−1CC < 1) of 1 and pti j+t−1 < 1, so that
PtCC(ti j)> pti j+t−1 for any t > 1. Similarly, from (S2) (time-shifted from t−1 to t), we see that PtCD(ti j) is an interior convex
combination of δε (the smallest of the pt for t ≥ 1) and the transformation of Pt−1CD by rule (S1). By construction, we hence
have PtCD(ti j)< pti j+t−1 for any t > 1.
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Figure S6. The dynamics of the recursion (S2). (a) The right-hand side of (S2) for δε = 0.05 (solid thick line; the thin line is
the diagonal) and the probabilities PtCD(1), t = 1, . . . ,10 (dots). (b) The fixed point P∞CD and the asymptotic rate of convergence
(the local slope 1−√δε (4− 3δε) of the right-hand side of (S2) at the fixed point) as a function of δε . The slope is in (−1,1)
(asymptotic stability) for all δε ∈ (0,1) and in (0,1) (monotonic convergence) for δε ∈ (0,1/3).
t pt PtCD P
t
CC
1 δε δε δε
2 2δε − δ 2ε 2δε − 2δ 2ε + δ 3ε 3δε − 3δ 2ε + δ 3ε
3 3δε − 3δ 2ε + δ 3ε 3δε − 8δ 2ε + 15δ 3ε − 17δ 4ε + 12δ 5ε · · ·+ δ 7ε 6δε − 15δ 2ε + 20δ 3ε − 15δ 4ε + 6δ 5ε − δ 6ε
4 4δε − 6δ 2ε + 4δ 3ε − δ 4ε 4δε − 20δ 2ε + 80δ 3ε − 234δ 4ε + 525δ 5ε · · ·+ δ 15ε 10δε − 45δ 2ε + 120δ 3ε − 210δ 4ε + 252δ 5ε · · ·− δ 10ε
5 5δε − 10δ 2ε + 10δ 3ε − 5δ 4ε + δ 5ε 5δε − 40δ 2ε + 276δ 3ε − 1514δ 4ε + 6871δ 5ε · · ·+ δ 31ε 15δε − 105δ 2ε + 455δ 3ε − 1365δ 4ε + 3003δ 5ε · · ·+ δ 15ε
Table S1. Probabilities pt , PtCD(1), and PtCC(1) (i.e., starting with P1CD = p1 = δε ).
S4 The predicted payoff gain ∆pihC
After any game round, each of the ki probabilities pi j of the C-individual i is either 1 or equal to pti j for some ti j ≥ 1. In
revising her strategy, i assumes the strategy of j unchanged since they last interacted. That is, i believes j to be a C if they
either both cooperated at the last round or j did not play because the last time they interacted i exploited j, so that p ji < 1, and
then i changed to C. In both situations, pi j = 1. Conversely, i believes j to be a D if the last time they interacted j exploited i,
so that pi j < 1. C’s can hence underestimate the number of their C-neighbors. Let kC,i (≤ ki) be the number of C-neighbors of
individual i and k′C,i (≤ kC,i) the number of pi j = 1.
Assuming no strategy change in the neighborhood within the predictive horizon h (see Methods in the main text for a
discussion of this assumption), i computes the expected payoffs accumulated in the next h rounds behaving as D, pihCD, or as
C, pihCC, as follows:
• Initialize pihCD = 0 and pihCC = 0 and consider the sums
ShCD(τ) =
h
∑
t=1
PtCD(τ) and ShCC(τ) =
h
∑
t=1
PtCC(τ) (S6)
(note that ti j must be replaced with τ in the right-hand side of recursion (S4) to define PtCC(τ) in terms of PtCC(τ −1));
• For each pi j = 1, add r ShCD(t ji) to pihCD;
• For each pi j = 1, add (r− 1)ShCC(t ji) to pihCC;
• For each pi j < 1, subtract ShCD(ti j) from pihCC.
Then, ∆pihC = pihCD−pihCC, i.e.,
∆pihC = ∑
pi j=1
(
rShCD(t ji)− (r− 1)ShCC(t ji)
)
+ ∑
pi j<1
ShCD(ti j)
= −r ∑
pi j=1
(
ShCC(t ji)− ShCD(t ji)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 for h≥ 2, see (S5)
)
+ ∑
pi j=1
ShCC(t ji)+ ∑
pi j<1
ShCD(ti j). (S7)
Note that the indexes t ji are involved in the computation, i.e., if j refused to play with i at the last game round, we assume
that i remembers when she has last exploited j. Also note that
∆pi1C = ∑
pi j=1
(rp ji− (r− 1)p ji)+ ∑
pi j<1
pi j = ∑
pi j=1
p ji + ∑
pi j<1
pi j > 0, (S8)
i.e., defect is the best-response for h = 1.
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(asymptotic stability) for all δε ∈ (0,1) and in (0,1) (monotonic convergence) for δε ∈ (0,1/3).
t pt PtCD P
t
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1 δε δε δε
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Table S1. Probabilities pt , PtCD(1), and P
t
CC(1) (i.e., starting with P
1
CD = p1 = δε ).
S4 The predicted payoff gain ∆pihC
After any game round, each of the ki probabilities pi j of the C-individual i is either 1 or equal to pti j for some ti j ≥ 1. In revising
h r strategy, i assumes the strategy of j unchanged since th y last interacted. That is, i believes j to be a C if they either both
cooperated at the l st round or j did not play because the l st tim they int racted i exploited j, so that p ji < 1, and then i
c a ged to C. In both situations, pi j = 1. Conversely, i believes j to be a D if the last time they interacted j exploited i, so
that pi j < 1. C’s can hence underestimate the number of their C-neighbors. Let kC,i (≤ ki) be the number of C-neighbors of
individual i and k′C,i (≤ kC,i) the number of pi j = 1.
Assu ing no strategy change in the neighborhood ithin the predictive horizon h (see ethods in the main text for a
discussion of this assumption), i computes the xpected payoffs accumulated in the next h rounds behaving as D, pihCD, or as C,
pihCC, as follows:
• Initialize pihCD = 0 and pihCC = 0 and consider the sums
ShCD(τ) =
h
t=1
PtCD(τ) and S
h
CC(τ) =
h
t=1
PtCC(τ) (S6)
(note that ti j must be replaced with τ in the right-hand side of recursion (S4) to define PtCC(τ) in terms of P
t
CC(τ−1) ;
• For each pi j = 1, add r ShCD(t ji) to pihCD;
• For each pi j = 1, add (r−1)ShCC(t ji) to pihCC;
• For each pi j < 1, subtract ShCD(ti j) from pihCC.
Then, ∆pihC = pi
h
CD−pihCC, i.e.,
∆pihC =
pi j=1
(
rShCD(t ji)− (r−1)ShCC(t ji)
)
+
pi j<1
ShCD(ti j)
= −r
pi j=1
(
ShCC(t ji)−ShCD(t ji)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 for h≥ 2, se (S5)
)
+
pi j=1
ShCC(t ji)+
pi j<1
ShCD(ti j). (S7)
Note that the indexes t ji are involved in the computation, i.e., if j refused to play with i at the last game round, we as ume
that i remembers when she has last exploited j. Also note that
∆pi1C =
pi j=1
(rp ji− (r−1)p ji)+
pi j<1
pi j =
pi j=1
p ji+
pi j<1
pi j > 0, (S8)
i.e., defect is the best-response for h = 1.
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S5 The predicted payoff gain ∆pihD
After any game round, the D-individual i has probability pi j = 1 toward each of her ki neighbors and full information, i.e.,
knowledge of the p ji of the kC,i ≤ ki C-neighbors. In revising her strategy (assuming no strategy change in the neighborhood
within the predictive horizon h, see Methods in the main text), i computes the expected payoffs accumulated in the next h
rounds behaving as C, pihDC, or as D, pi
h
DD, as follows:
• Initialize pihDC = 0 and pihDD = 0 and consider the sums ShCD and ShCC in (S6);
• For each C-neighbor j, add (r−1)ShCC(t ji) to pihDC;
• For each C-neighbor j, add rShCD(t ji) to pihDD.
• For each D-neighbor j, subtract ShCD(1) from pihDC;
Then, ∆pihD = pi
h
DC−pihDD, i.e.,
∆pihD = ∑
m j=C
(
(r−1)ShCC(t ji)− rShCD(t ji)
)− ∑
m j=D
ShCD(1)
= r ∑
m j=C
(
ShCC(t ji)−ShCD(t ji)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 for h≥ 2, see (S5)
)− ∑
m j=C
ShCC(t ji)− ∑
m j=D
ShCD(1), (S9)
where m j ∈ {C,D} is the strategy of individual j and the sums span the neighborhood of individual i.
Note that
∆pi1D = ∑
m j=C
((r−1)p ji− rp ji)− ∑
m j=D
p1 =− ∑
m j=C
p ji− (k− kC)p1 < 0, (S10)
i.e., defect is the best-response for h = 1.
S6 Proof of condition (2) and the threshold r∞C
With an infinite predictive horizon (h→ ∞), the sums ShCD(τ) and ShCC(τ) in (S6) diverge with ShCD/h→ P∞CD and ShCC/h→ 1
independently of τ . Consequently, for a C- and a D-individual with degree k and kC ≤ k C-neighbors, the predicted payoff
gains ∆pihC and ∆pi
h
D (from eqs. (S7) and (S9)) are unbounded with
∆pihC/h → −rk′C(1−P∞CD)+ k′C+(k− k′C)P∞CD, (S11a)
∆pihD/h → rkC(1−P∞CD)− kC− (k− kC)P∞CD, (S11b)
where, for a C, k′C ≤ kC is the number of pi j = 1.
Solving ∆pihC/h < 0 and ∆pi
h
D/h > 0 in the limits in (S11) gives condition (2) in the main text. The threshold r
∞
C on r above
which cooperation fixates starting from any cluster of (at least two) C’s is then obtained from (2) by setting k to the largest
degree kmax in the network and kC = 1, i.e.,
r∞C = 1+ kmax
P∞CD
1−P∞CD
. (S12)
S7 The effect of the predictive horizon h
From eqs. (S7) and (S9), it immediately follows that the contributions to the predicted payoff gains ∆pihC and ∆pi
h
D of one more
prediction step are
∆pih+1C −∆pihC =−r ∑
pi j=1
(
Ph+1CC (t ji)−Ph+1CD (t ji)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 for h≥ 1, see (S5)
)
+ ∑
pi j=1
Ph+1CC (t ji)+ ∑
pi j<1
Ph+1CD (ti j) (S13)
and
∆pih+1D −∆pihD = r ∑
m j=C
(
Ph+1CC (t ji)−Ph+1CD (t ji)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 for h≥ 1, see (S5)
)− ∑
m j=C
Ph+1CC (t ji)− ∑
m j=D
Ph+1CD (1). (S14)
For any h≥ 1, the first can be made arbitrarily negative, the second arbitrarily positive, by a sufficiently large r. Any multi-step
predictive horizon (h≥ 2) is hence sufficient for the evolution of rational reciprocity, provided the game return is large enough.
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Figure S7. Surplus of the probability to reciprocate PhCC(τ) over the probability of getting exploited PhCD(τ). Plot of the
surplus versus the reciprocity-biased rate of strategy update δε . (a) Different values of the predictive horizon (h = 2, . . . ,5)
and initializations of the probability to play at the next round (τ = 0, . . . ,9). (b) The case τ = 1 in a single panel. Colored
lines: PhCC(τ)−PhCD(τ); black thin line: 1−P∞CD for comparison.
Instead, for a given r, the effect on cooperation of extending the predictive horizon is positive, i.e., ∆pihC and ∆pihD are
respectively decreasing and increasing with h ≥ 1, if
r > 1+
∑pi j=1 Ph+1CD (t ji)+∑pi j<1 Ph+1CD (ti j)
∑pi j=1
(
Ph+1CC (t ji)−Ph+1CD (t ji)
) and r > 1+ ∑m j=C Ph+1CD (t ji)+∑m j=D Ph+1CD (1)
∑m j=C
(
Ph+1CC (t ji)−Ph+1CD (t ji)
) , (S15)
obtained by solving ∆pih+1C −∆pihC < 0 and ∆pih+1D −∆pihD > 0 for r from eqs. (S13) and (S14).
The denominators in (S15) are minimized by t ji = 1. Indeed, t ji = 0 gives Ph+1CC (0)−Ph+1CD (0) = 1−PhCD(1) > 1−P∞CD
(note that we used Ph+1CD (0) = PhCD(1), though Ph+1CD (τ) 6= PhCD(τ +1) for τ ≥ 1). And for t ji ≥ 1, Ph+1CC (t ji)−Ph+1CD (t ji) increases
with t ji for any δε ∈ (0,1) and remains below 1−P∞CD for t ji = 1 (checked numerically, see Fig. S7a for h = 2, . . . ,5).
Since the quantity Ph+1CC (1)−Ph+1CD (1) increases with h (and converges to 1−P∞CD for large h, see Fig. S7b), a lower bound
to the denominators in (S15) is P2CC(1)−P2CD(1) = δε(1−δε ) (see Table S1) to be multiplied by k′C (the number of pi j = 1) in
the left condition and by kC (the number of C-neighbors of individual i) in the right one. An upper bound to the numerators is
k(1+3δε)/4, obtained by replacing Ph+1CD (t ji), Ph+1CD (ti j), and Ph+1CD (1) with the maximal value assumed by the right-most side
of (S2), i.e., with δε + 14 (1− δε).
We then have ∆pih+1C −∆pihC < 0 and ∆pih+1D −∆pihD > 0 for any h ≥ 1 under
r > 1+ kkC
1+ 3δε
4δε(1− δε) , (S16)
Note that condition (S16) might be very conservative, especially for small δε . Moreover, even if ∆pihC and ∆pihD are respectively
increasing and decreasing with small h, they become and remain decreasing and increasing (under condition (2) in the main
text) for sufficiently large h. Indeed, the right-hand sides in (S15) converge to the right-hand side of (2) for large h.
S8 The threshold rhC
With a finite horizon h ≥ 2, it is already evident from eqs. (S7) and (S9) that, for any given network structure, there is a
threshold rhC on r above which ∆pihC < 0 and ∆pihD > 0 for any C- and D-individual i with at least one known C-neighbor (i.e.,
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obtained by solving ∆pih+1C −∆pihC < 0 and ∆pih+1D −∆pihD > 0 for r from eqs. (S13) and (S14).
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With a finite horizon h ≥ 2, it is already evident from eqs. (S7) and (S9) that, for any given network structure, there is a
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Figure S8. The sum ShCD(τ). Plot of the sum versus the reciprocity-biased rate of strategy update δε for different values of
the predictive horizon (h = 2, . . . ,5) and initializations of the probability to play at the next round (τ = 0, . . . ,9). Colored lines:
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pi j = 1 if i is a C, m j = C if i is a D, for at least one j). Solving ∆pihC < 0 and ∆pihD > 0 for r from eqs. (S7) and (S9) gives
r > 1+
∑pi j=1 ShCD(t ji)+∑pi j<1 ShCD(ti j)
∑pi j=1
(
ShCC(t ji)− ShCD(t ji)
) and r > 1+ ∑m j=C ShCD(t ji)+∑m j=D ShCD(1)∑m j=C (ShCC(t ji)− ShCD(t ji)) , (S17)
from which we note that the r-threshold for a C to remain C (left) is typically lower than that for a D with same neighborhood to
switch to C (right). Indeed, the denominators in (S17) grow with t ji, as each (positive) element of the sum ShCC(t ji)−ShCD(t ji) =
∑ht=1
(
PtCC(t ji)−PtCD(t ji)
)
does (see Fig. S7a), and the indexes t ji are expected to be higher for a C-individual i.
In the following we derive an upper bound to rhC consistent with the limit in (S12). For any h ≥ 2, the threshold rhC
is the maximal value attained by the right-hand sides in (S17) over all possible choices of the node i and over all possible
configurations of its neighborhood (in terms of the strategies mi and m j and of the probabilities pi j and pi j), restricting
however the search to configurations with at least one known C-neighbor that can be reached from an initial state (a state with
pi j = p ji = 1 for all connected pairs (i, j) and pi j = p ji = 0 otherwise).
As noted above, the denominators in (S17) are minimized by t ji = 1. Moreover, the sum over j comprises a single element
if individual i knows to have only one C-neighbor. A lower bound to the denominators in (S17) is hence ShCC(1)−ShCD(1), that
can be easily be tabulated w.r.t. h from Table S1. At numerator there are ki terms of the kind ShCD(τ). The value of τ ≥ 0 that
maximizes ShCD(τ) unfortunately depends on both h and δε , so we cannot upper bound the numerator by a specific choice of
τ . However, we note that ShCD(τ) is upper bounded by 1+(h− 1)P∞CD (checked numerically, see Fig. S8 for h = 2, . . . ,5).
The threshold rhC is hence upper bounded by
rhC < r¯
h
C = 1+ kmax
1+(h− 1)P∞CD
ShCC(1)− ShCD(1)
= 1+ kmax
1
h +(1− 1h )P∞CD
ShCC(1)
h −
ShCD(1)
h
, (S18)
obtained by taking i as the node with highest degree kmax. The bound r¯hC converges for large h to r∞C (from above under
condition (2); ShCC(1)/h→ 1 and ShCD(1)/h→ P∞CD). It is confirmed by all our simulations, though it can be quite conservative,
especially for small δε .
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Figure S8. The sum ShCD(τ). Plot of the sum versus the r ciprocity-biased rate of strategy upd t δε for different values of the
predictive horizon (h = 2, . . . ,5) and initializations of the probability to play at the next round (τ = 0, . . . ,9). Colored lines:
ShCD(τ); black thin line: the upper bound 1+(h−1)P∞CD.
pi j = 1 if i is a C, m j = C f i is a D, for at least one j). Solving ∆pihC < 0 and ∆pi
h
D > 0 for r from eqs. (S7) and (S9) gives
r > 1+
∑pi j=1 S
h
CD(t ji)+∑pi j<1 S
h
CD(ti j)
∑pi j=1
(
ShCC(t ji)−ShCD(t ji)
) and r > 1+ ∑m j=C ShCD(t ji)+∑m j=D ShCD(1)
∑m j=C
(
ShCC(t ji)−ShCD(t ji)
) , (S17)
from which we note that the r-threshold for a C to remain C (left) is typically ower than that for a D with same neighbor ood to
switch to C (right). Indeed, the denominators in (S17) grow with t ji, as each (positive) element f the sum ShCC(t ji)−ShCD(t ji) =
∑ht=1
(
PtCC(t ji)−PtCD(t ji)
)
does (see Fig. S7a), and the indexes t ji are xpected o be high r for a C-individual i.
In the following we derive an upper bound to rhC consistent with the limit in (S12). For any h ≥ 2, the threshold rhC is
the maximal value attained by the right-hand sides in (S17) over all possible choices of the node i and over all possible
configurations of its neighborhood (in terms of the strategies mi and m j and of the prob bilities pi j and pi j), restricti g
however the search to configurations with at least o e known C-neighbor that ca be reached from an initial state (a state with
pi j = p ji = 1 for all connected pairs (i, j) and pi j = p ji = 0 otherwise).
As noted above, the denominators in (S17) are min mized by t ji = 1. Moreover, the sum over j comprises a single element
if individual i knows to have only one C-neighbor. A lower bound to the denomi at rs in (S17) is hence ShCC(1 −ShCD(1), that
can be easily be t bulat d w.r.t. h from Table S1. At numerator there are ki terms of the kind ShCD(τ). The value of τ ≥ 0 that
maximizes ShCD(τ) unfortunately depends o both h and δε , so we cannot upper bound the num at r by a specific ch ice of τ .
However, we note that ShCD(τ) is upper bounded by 1+(h−1)P∞CD (checked numerically, see Fig. S8 for h = 2, . . . ,5).
The threshold rhC is hence upper bounded by
rhC < r¯
h
C = 1+ kmax
1+(h−1)P∞CD
ShCC(1)−ShCD(1)
= 1+ kmax
1
h +(1− 1h )P∞CD
ShCC(1)
h −
ShCD(1)
h
, (S18)
obtained by taking i as the node with highest degree kmax. The bound r¯hC converges for large h to r
∞
C (from above under
condition (2); ShCC(1)/h→ 1 and ShCD(1)/h→ P∞CD). It is confirmed by all our si ulations, though it can be quite conservative,
especially for small δε .
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S9 Relevant probabilities for strategy update
Two probabilities regarding the process of strategy update have been used in discussing the analytical results in the main text.
The first, P′update,k, is the probability that, in a (possibly infinite) sequence of game rounds, one or more of the k ≥ 1 neighbors
of a given individual revise their strategy before she does. The second, P′′update,k, is the probability that, in a (possibly infinite)
sequence of game rounds in a star configuration, at least half of the k ≥ 2 leaves revise their strategy (at least once) before
central one does (k even).
To compute these two probabilities, recall that after each game round the probability that an individual with degree k does
not revise strategy, while some of her neighbors do, is
P′′′update,k = (1−δ )
(
1− (1−δ )k). (S19)
Then, P′update,k is obtained as the following geometric series
P′update,k = P
′′′
update,k
∞
∑
t=0
(1−δ )t(k+1) = P′′′update,k
1
1− (1−δ )k+1 = 1−
δ
1− (1−δ )k+1 , (S20)
where the t-th element of the sum is the probability that the strategy update occurs after round t + 1 (i.e., with no revision
after the first t rounds). Note that, for small δ , P′update,k approaches 1− 1/(k+ 1) from below (use Hoˆpital or note that
(1−δ )k+1 ≈ 1− (k+1)δ +O(δ 2) by the binomial expansion).
The probability P′′update,k is too complex to be characterized analytically. However, for small δ , we can assume that after
each game round either none or at most one of the k leaves of the star does revise strategy, i.e., we neglect the probability
1
2 k(k−1)δ 2(1−δ )k−2 w.r.t. kδ (1−δ )k−1. Then,
P′′update,k ≈
k
∏
k′=k/2+1
P′update,k′ = 1−
1− (1−δ )k/2
1− (1−δ )k+1 = 1−
k/2
k+1
+O(δ ) =
1
2
+
1
2(k+1)
+O(δ ). (S21)
Thus, P′′update,k >
1
2 for small δ , whereas it obviously drops to zero as δ → 1 (for δ = 1, all individuals revise strategy after each
game round). Numerically (with a Monte-Carlo approach), we have checked that for δ = 0.05 (the baseline value used in
Fig. 3) P′′update,k remains larger than
1
2 for stars with up to 70 nodes, that is not far from the maximal degree of the scale-free
networks used in our simulations (see Table S2).
S10 Stalemate and fluctuations in the network of Fig. 1b
Consider the network and the initial state of Fig. 1b, with i = 1, j = 2, nodes 3 to k1+1 being the k1−1 initial C-neighbors of
1, and nodes k1+2 to k1+k2 being the k2−1 initial D-neighbors of 2, k1,k2 > 2.
After the first game round, at which all individuals participate (i.e., no C abstains from playing), the strategy-revising
C-individual 1 remains C if
r > r0C,1 = 1+
(k1−1)ShCD(0)+ShCD(1)
(k1−1)(h−ShCD(0))
= 1+
ShCD(0)
h−ShCD(0)
+
1
k1−1
ShCD(1)
h−ShCD(0)
(S22)
(from the left inequality in (S17), taking into account that 1 lowered to p1 the probability to play with 2 at second round, i.e.,
t12 = 1). The strategy-revising D-individual 2 changes to C if
r > r0D,2 = 1+ k2
ShCD(1)
ShCC(1)−ShCD(1)
(S23)
(from the right inequality in (S17)). Strategy-revising C-individuals 3 to k1+1 remain C under
r > r0C,3 = 1+
ShCD(0)
h−ShCD(0)
, (S24)
(from the left inequality in (S17) with ti1 = t1i = 0, i = 3, . . . ,k1+1), a condition implied by (S22). Strategy-revising D-
individuals k1+2 to k1+k2 remain D because have no C-neighbors.
Assume that no one changes. After the second game round, if 1 played with 2, the situation is the same as after the first
round; otherwise, after a consecutive abstentions, the strategy-revising C-individual 1 remains C if
r > raC,1 = 1+
(k1−1)ShCD(0)+ShCD(a+1)
(k1−1)(h−ShCD(0))
= 1+
ShCD(0)
h−ShCD(0)
+
1
k1−1
ShCD(a+1)
h−ShCD(0)
, (S25)
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while the strategy-revising D-individual 2 changes to C if
r > raD,2 = 1+
ShCD(a+1)+(k2−1)ShCD(1)
ShCC(a+1)−ShCD(a+1)
. (S26)
Again, strategy-revising C-individuals 3 to k1+1 remain C under (S24) and strategy-revising D-individuals k1+2 to k1+k2 do
not change strategy.
The threshold raC,1 is larger than r
0
C,1 for small a (S
h
CD(a+1) grows with a≥ 0 as long a is sufficiently small, see Fig. S8) and
decreases with k1, while raD,2 decreases with a for sufficiently large k2 (S
h
CC(a+1)−ShCD(a+1) grows with a≥ 0 as discussed
in Sect. S8) and increases with k2. For sufficiently large k1 and k2, we therefore have maxa raC,1 < mina r
a
D,2. However, the
opposite relation is also possible for any a,k1,k2, provided δε is sufficiently small.
If maxa raC,1 < r < mina r
a
D,2, the network is in a stalemate. The network can also reach a stalemate. Imagine node 2 to be
initially a C, with its condition to remain such after the first round unsatisfied, i.e.,
r < 1+
ShCD(0)+(k2−1)ShCD(1)
h−ShCD(0)
, (S27)
(possible for sufficiently large k2) and the condition for 1 to remain C met, that is r > r0C,3 from (S24). Then, if 2 changes to D
the network goes in the stalemate.
But the same network can also produce long-term fluctuations. Consider the initial state of Fig. 1b with r0C,1 < r < r
a
C,1 <
mina raD,2 for some a > 0. Then, the C-individual 1 is the only willing to change after a consecutive abstentions. Once 1
switches to D, she will remain such for some game rounds. If in the meantime the C-neighbors 3 to k1+1 do not change strategy
and abstain for a rounds, the condition for 1 to go back C becomes
r > 1+
(k1−1)ShCD(a+1)+ShCD(1)
(k1−1)(ShCC(a+1)−ShCD(a+1))
, (S28)
that is satisfied for large enough a (ShCD(a+1) converges to S
h
CD(0) for large a, so that the right-hand side of (S28) approaches
r0C,1). Once 1 switches back to C after a sufficiently long abstention of nodes 3 to k1+1, the situation is essentially the one just
after the first game round.
The above example shows that long-term fluctuations are possible, though sometime difficult to observe. They might
require specific sequences of events. Essentially, once an individual changes strategy and plays a game round, she is not in the
condition to switch back. A D changes to C when the probabilities that most of her C-neighbors play in the next rounds are
sufficiently high, otherwise she will mostly play with D-neighbors; and the strategy change further raises such probabilities,
making the switch to D unattractive in the near future. As well, switching to D lowers the probabilities that the C-neighbors
play in the next rounds, thus preventing the near switch to C.
S11 Networks
We used six standard types of networks—three regular and three random—of N = 1000 nodes and M = N〈k〉/2 links, 〈k〉
denoting the average degree. For each random type, we generated 100 networks. Details on the networks’ structure and
generation algorithms are given below. Table S2 reports several structural indicators (averaged over the 100 generated networks
for random types). See Ref.58 for further details on generation and analysis of complex networks.
S11.1 Regular networks
Planar lattices: rectangular lattices of N nodes with degree k = 4 (horizontal and vertical links—square lattices) and k = 8
(also including diagonal links) with periodic boundary conditions. We used lattices of 40×25 nodes.
Ring lattices: loops of N nodes each connected to the k/2 nearest nodes in both left and right directions in the loop. We used
only k = 4 (the degree k must be an even integer).
Complete network: each node is connected to all N−1 others.
S11.2 Random networks
Watts-Strogatz (WS) with full rewiring: WS rewiring of all left links of a degree-k ring lattice.59 We use this model to generate
single-scale random networks, i.e., networks with sufficiently narrow degree distribution—small variance—so that the average
degree 〈k〉 = k well describes the ‘scale’ of the connections. The standard single-scale model is the Erdo¨s–Re´nyi58 (ER)
random network, where each of the M = N〈k〉/2 links is included with probability p=M/(N(N−1)/2) = 〈k〉/(N−1) and the
binomial degree distribution—binomial(k,N−1, p)—converges for large N to the Poisson with parameter 〈k〉. The resulting
network is however disconnected if 〈k〉/N is too small (it is disconnected with probability 1 if p < lnN/N, a condition that
is met in our simulations with N = 1000 and 〈k〉 = 4). Though connectivity can be easily forced, the effects on the degree
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Network 〈k〉 σk kmin kmax Diameter Average Transitivitydistance
Planar lattice 4 0 4 4 32 16.3 0
8 0 8 8 20 11.3 0.42
Ring lattice 4 0 4 4 250 125.38 0.5
Complete network 999 0 999 999 1 1 1
Watts-Strogatz 4 1.40 2 9.85 9.0 5.32 0.003
8 1.99 4 15.87 5.3 3.59 0.007
Baraba´si-Albert 4 5.24 2 82.27 7.32 4.07 0.027
8 8.81 4 108.6 5.0 3.17 0.037
Holme-Kim 4 5.40 2 89.13 11.06 4.88 0.738
8 8.96 4 115.8 5.44 3.26 0.284
Table S2. Networks’ structural indicators (averaged over 100 networks for random models). Columns 〈k〉, σk, kmin, and kmax
respectively report the average, standard deviation, min and max of the nodes’ degree. Network size N = 1000 nodes; number
of links M = N〈k〉/2.
distribution are not easily quantifiable. We therefore opted for the WS model that grants (almost sure) connectivity by the
unaltered right-links of the initial ring lattice. Note that the WS model is typically used with low rewiring probability (of the
left links) to show the ‘small-world’ property (significant network transitivity and small diameter), whereas we use it here with
full rewiring to better approximate an ER network. Indeed, the resulting degree distribution,60
P(k) =
{
0 if k < 〈k〉/2, otherwise
binomial(k−〈k〉/2,(N−1)〈k〉/2,1/(N−1)) −−−→N→∞
{
0 if k < 〈k〉/2, otherwise
(〈k〉/2)k−〈k〉/2/(k−〈k〉/2)!exp(−〈k〉/2) , (S29)
is Poissonian-like for large N (see, e.g., Fig. 1b).
Baraba´si-Albert (BA): BA degree-rank preferential attachment of 〈k〉/2 links.61 We use this model to generate scale-free
random networks, i.e., networks with broad degree distribution—large variance—showing low- and high-connected nodes,
in spite of their average degree. The BA algorithm produces networks with degree distribution that is zero for k < 〈k〉/2 and
converges, for large k and N, to a power law with exponent −3, hence showing an large variance (infinite variance in the limit
N→ ∞). The transitivity—the average over the network’s nodes of the fraction of connected neighbor pairs—increases with
〈k〉 but vanishes as (lnN)2/N for large N.62
Holme-Kim (HK): HK scale-free networks with tunable transitivity.63 We use this model to generate scale-free random networks
with non-vanishing transitivity for large size. With a tunable probability (that we set to 1), the HK algorithm alternates steps
of degree-rank preferential attachment with steps in which a triangle is closed between the new node, the last preferred node
and a neighbor of the latter. The resulting transitivity does not vanish with N and decreases with 〈k〉, because the higher
number of triangles closed with larger 〈k〉 does not compensate for the increased number of possibilities. The theoretical degree
distribution for large N is the same of the BA model. However, w.r.t. a finite BA network, the HK algorithm raises the number
of low- and high-connected nodes to the detriment of nodes with intermediate degree (checked on average in our 100 networks).
Imagine, e.g., to raise transitivity by rewiring. One option is to increase the number of hub-hub connections, to close triangles
with common leaves. This is achieved by detaching the termination of a hub’s link to reconnect it to another hub. The latter
node gains a link, while the looser moves left in the degree distribution. For another option to increase transitivity in scale-free
networks—by introducing the small-world property—see Ref.62.
S12 Numerical simulations
For each panel of Figs. 3 and S1–S5 and for each value of the predictive horizon (h = 2, . . . ,5), we have first run simulations
to identify the thresholds rhC,min and r
h
C,max (all simulations reach all-D for r ≤ rhC,min; all-C for r ≥ rhC,max). We have then run
simulations for r in the open interval (rhC,min,r
h
C,max) using an equally spaced grid with resolution of about 0.2 (except for
Fig. S2b in which the scale of r is larger). For a given network of N nodes (labeled 1 to N) and assigned model parameters (δ ,
ε , h, r) (see Table S3), we used the following simulation procedure (implemented in Matlab).
Initial state
Initial C-level: we used either 1% or 50%. Let NC denote the number of initial C’s, i.e., NC = 10 or 500 for our networks of
N = 1000 nodes.
Random placement of the initial C’s: The first NC nodes of a random (uniform distribution) permutation of the integers
{1, . . . ,N} are set to C; all others are set to D.
Degree-rank placement of the initial C’s: the NC nodes with highest degree are set to C (random choice, if needed, among the
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Parameter Description Baseline values Other values
N Network size 1000 –
δ rate of strategy update 0.05 0.025, 0.1
ε reciprocity 0 0.5, −1
δε reciprocity-biased δ 0.05 (1− ε)δ
h predictive horizon 2, 3, 4, 5 –
r PD game return [1,6] [20,60] in Fig. S2b
Table S3. Model parameters.
nodes sharing the smallest selected degree); all others are set to D.
Probabilities to play: pi j = p ji = 1 for all connected pairs (i, j); pi j = p ji = 0 otherwise.
Random number generation
For each simulation, we used two independent random number generators, one to generate the network (for random network
models) and the initial state, and one to perform the simulation (game interaction and strategy update). The pair of initialization
seeds for the two generators uniquely identify the simulation and are stored to allow reproduction.
Simulation length and outcome
Max. number of game rounds: 500/δ game rounds (= 104 for our baseline value of δ ). It is the time length within which each
individual revises strategy 500 times, on average.
Early termination: termination in all-C or all-D before the last game round. There is no reason to continue the simulation, as
all-C and all-D are both invariant states (trivial stalemates).
Outcome: 1/0 in case of termination in all-C/D; otherwise, the average C-level (fraction of C-nodes) over the last 100/δ (20%
of) game rounds (after strategy update).
Classification
Trivial stalemate: termination in all-C or all-D.
Nontrivial stalemate: termination different from all-C and all-D with no strategy change in the last 100/δ (20% of) game
rounds. There is of course no guarantee that this criterion identifies real stalemates. In practice, we classify as nontrivial
stalemates the cases in which evolution slows down so much to be in a ‘practical’ stalemate.
Long-term fluctuation: termination different from all-C and all-D with some strategy change in the last 100/δ game rounds
yielding a regression slope within 10−6 (the slope of the regression line over the last 100/δ game rounds does not exceed ±1
individual over 1000 game rounds). This is also a practical criterion.
Non-convergence: termination different from all-C and all-D with some strategy change in the last 100/δ game rounds yielding
a regression slope exceeding ±10−6.
Results
We applied the above classifications to all simulations of Figs. 3 and S1–S5 performed for rhC,min < r < r
h
C,max, i.e., for values of
the game return r and the predictive horizon h for which neither all simulations ended in all-C nor in all-D. The results, grouped
by type of network and initialization (i.e., by figure panel) are reported in Table S4. (W.r.t. the predictive horizon h within each
panel, we note that the occurrence of stalemates and fluctuations and the corresponding levels of C slightly increase up to h = 4
or 5). Only for Fig. 3, the simulations not ended in all-C or all-D have been extended to a ten-times longer timescale to validate
the classification (see rows labeled ‘l.t.’ in Table S4).
Trivial stalemates
• They constitute a significant fraction of outcomes independently of the network’s structure and initialization, all-D
dominating close to rhC,min, all-C close to r
h
C,max.
• They are majority starting from 1% initial C’s, especially in regular and single-scale networks, and their frequencies
slightly increase (especially all-C) by extending the simulations on a longer timescale (compare regular with ‘l.t.’ rows in
the classification of Fig. 3), not only because of the reduced fractions of non-convergent simulations, but also because
apparent nontrivial stalemates and fluctuations eventually end up in all-C or all-D.
• They seem to occur less frequently for 50% initial C’s (see the classification of Figs. S1 and S2b,d), though part of
the effect is due to the slower convergence (see the fractions of non-convergent simulations and the comment below on
convergence).
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• They are more frequent at higher connectivity (compare 〈k〉= 4 with 〈k〉= 8) to the detriment of nontrivial stalemates
and fluctuations, but also because of the faster convergence.
• Increasing network heterogeneity (from single-scale to scale-free networks) gives more room to nontrivial outcomes.
Moreover, all-C relatively gains over all-D with random placement of the initial C, whereas the opposite seems to occur for
degree-rank-C-placement. This is perhaps due to the higher/lower r-values in the first/second case. At higher/lower game
returns, D’s require more/less C-neighbors to change strategy (see condition (2) in the main text), so that convergence to
all-D from 1% initial C’s is less/more likely. Moreover, the evolution of cooperations is faster/slower (see below the
comment below on convergence), and the fraction of non-convergent simulations is accordingly smaller/larger.
Nontrivial stalemates
• They are infrequent and occur at low levels of C starting from 1% initial C’s, especially in regular and single-scale
networks, with the exception of the complete network. And they are even less frequent if the classification is performed
on a longer timescale (compare regular with ‘l.t.’ rows in Fig. 3).
• They occur at medium-high C-levels starting from 50% initial C’s, and they seem to be particularly frequent in high-
connected lattices (Fig. S1b) and in low-connected scale-free networks with degree-rank-C-placement (Fig. S1i).
• In general, while stalemates at low C-levels require high game returns (to allow C’s with few C-neighbors to remain C’s),
stalemates at high C-levels require low returns (not allowing the invasion of cooperation, otherwise invasion reduces the
requirement on r for the further spread of C’s and evolution cannot halt in a stalemate). The latter are hence reachable
only from significant initial C-levels.
• In the complete network, stalemates occur at the initial state (see the mean and variance of the C-level for Fig. S2c,d).
Indeed C’s and D’s all behave in the same condition and the gap between the r-values above which C’s do not change
and D’s do change is common to all individuals.
• The same gap is possible in high-connected lattices for game returns not allowing invasion.
• In scale-free networks, low returns allow a few hubs to remain defectors and the effect is even more evident under
degree-rank-C-placement (see the fraction and mean level of stalemates for Fig. S1i), because of the lower value of r.
• HK scale-free networks more easily fall in stalemate w.r.t. BA ones, at higher C-levels, essentially because HK-hubs share
more common leaves and this better supports stalemates in which some D-hubs exploit leaves that nonetheless remain C’s.
• Nontrivial stalemates are definitely less frequent at higher connectivity (compare 〈k〉= 4 with 〈k〉= 8), because of the
increased stalemate constraints, but also because the faster convergence (see below the comment below on convergence).
• Contrary to what happens starting from 50% initial C’s, degree-rank placement reduces the possibility for nontrivial
stalemates from 1% initial C’s (in both BA and HK scale-free networks for 〈k〉= 4, compare Figs. 3g,i and S5a,c), as it
reduces the game return that should be sufficiently large to allow low stalemates.
Long-term fluctuations
• They are infrequent and occur at low/high C-levels more or less as nontrivial stalemates do.
• Their amplitude (the min-max excursion of the asymptotic C-level) is always very limited. Most fluctuations are hence
practical stalemates of the evolutionary process. Figure S9 shows two relevant examples (with largest amplitude),
obtained for 1% (a) and 50% (b) initial C’s.
• Most of the comments reported for nontrivial stalemates apply to long-term fluctuations. In particular, starting from 1%
initial C’s, stalemates and fluctuations occur at low C-levels. With the exception of HK scale-free networks, the C-level
remains below 0.1 on average, with peaks at 0.2, so that the outcomes at medium-high C-levels (dots above 0.2 in Figs. 3,
S2a, S3, and S4) most likely correspond to non-convergent simulations with increasing regression slope, that should
reach all-C on a longer timescale. This indeed happens in most of (the few) cases in Fig. 3 by ten-folding the timescale.
• Note that the confounded effect of the type of placement is faded if the fractions of nontrivial stalemates and fluctuations
are considered together.
Non-convergent simulations
• Starting from 1% initial C’s, the fractions of non-convergent simulations (columns ‘n.c.+’ and ‘n.c.−’ in Table S4) are
sufficiently small to justify our timescale of 500 strategy updates, on average, for each individual, with the exception of
degree-4 ring lattices (Fig. S2a).
• Our primary goal is to identify the invasion and fixation thresholds rhC,min and rhC,max, i.e., starting from 1% initial C’s. To
allow fixation starting from low C-levels, we have therefore used a timescale a few times longer, in terms of number
of individual strategy updates, than the network’s diameter (see Table S2). The degree-4 ring lattice is indeed the only
network requiring the longer timescale. However, looking at the dots at zero C in Fig. S2a, we see that all-D outcomes
are present up to the identified rhC,max.
16/19
PSfrag replacements
a Scale-free network, strategic placement of initial C’s
b Scale-free network, random placement of initial C’s
time (game rounds) × 104
fra
ct
io
n
o
fC
’
s
r = 2.53
h = 3
〈k〉 = 4
1%initialC’s
r = 1.82
h = 5
〈k〉 = 4
50%initialC’s
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.4
0.45
0.5
Figure S9. Long-term fluctuations. Two examples observed in scale-free (BA) networks starting from 1% randomly placed
(a) and 50% degree-rank placed (b) initial C’s. Other parameters: see legends and baseline values in Table S3. Both simula-
tions are classified as long-term fluctuations in the timescale of 104 game rounds, i.e., based on rounds from 0.8 to 1 (×104,
shaded area); average asymptotic C-level 0.140 (a), 0.492 (b); fluctuation amplitude 0.008 (a), 0.011 (b).
• Non-convergent simulations are more frequent starting from 50% initial C’s. The evolution of cooperation is indeed
slower, because the values of r for which cooperation persists from 50% are lower than those for which cooperation
invades. At low r, a D needs to have a significant fraction of C-neighbors to change to C (see condition (2) in the
main text), so she will wait longer (i.e., more strategy updates) before opting for a strategy change, compared to a case
with higher r. In contrast, if r allows the invasion of C’s, D’s are willing to change strategy with few C-neighbors,
and this speeds up the spread of C’s. The classification of simulations starting from 50% initial C’s is therefore impre-
cise on our timescale. It however gives the interesting insights discussed above on nontrivial stalemates and fluctuations.
• The connectivity of the network speeds up the evolution of cooperation (compare the fractions of non-convergent simu-
lations for 〈k〉= 4 and 〈k〉= 8), especially if starting from 1% initial C’s. More connections favor the spread of the better
strategy and the higher values of r required for the invasion of cooperations further contribute to the faster convergence.
• Network heterogeneity seems to slow down the evolution of cooperation, because of possible bottlenecks in the network
structure. The effect is amplified under degree-rank-C-placement, as the thresholds rhC,min and rhC,max are lower w.r.t. to
single-scale networks.
• Finally, note that the majority of non-convergent simulations have positive regression slope, meaning that the C-level
observed on our timescale is underestimated. This is confirmed by the extended simulations performed for Fig. 3
(compare regular with ‘l.t.’ rows in Table S4), where all-C systematically gains w.r.t. the other outcomes.
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Figure S9. Long-term fluctuations. Two examples observed in scale-free (BA) networks starting from 1% randomly placed
(a) and 50% degree-rank placed (b) initial C’s. Other parameters: see legends and baseline values i Table S3. Both si ulations
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(compare regular with ‘l.t.’ rows in Table S4), where all-C systematically gains w.r.t. the other outcomes.
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Fig. Network Placement of Case Classification (%)initial C’s all-C all-D stalemate [〈C〉, σC] fluctuation [〈C〉,σC,〈A〉,σA] n.c.+ n.c.−
3a planar lattice random 1% 〈k〉= 4 47.50 51.67 0.39 [.004, 0] 0 [–, –, –, –] 0.44 0
l.t. 47.94 51.67 0.28 [.004, 0] 0.11 [.004, 0, .002, 0] 0 0
3b 〈k〉= 8 44.56 55.44 0 [–, –] 0 [–, –, –, –] 0 0
l.t. 44.56 55.44 0 [–, –] 0 [–, –, –, –] 0 0
3c single-scale random 〈k〉= 4 49.76 36.06 6.24 [.005, .003] 4.53 [.010, .007, .001, .001] 3.35 0.06
l.t. 56.01 36.82 2.29 [.004, .003] 4.53 [.010, .008, .003, .004] 0.35 0
3d 〈k〉= 8 55.41 42.97 0.31 [.003, .001] 1.11 [.006, .004, .002, .001] 0.17 0.03
l.t. 56.28 43.21 0 [–, –] 0.48 [.004, .002, .002, .002] 0.03 0
3e single-scale degree-rank 〈k〉= 4 60.59 30.23 3.05 [.007, .006] 3.95 [.012, .010, .001, .001] 2.18 0
l.t. 64.18 30.95 0.59 [.004, .002] 4.01 [.016, .015, .004, .005] 0.27 0
3f 〈k〉= 8 60.63 38.20 0.03 [.004, 0] 0.97 [.005, .003, .002, .001] 0.17 0
l.t. 61.33 38.37 0 [–, –] 0.30 [.007, .003, .002, .001] 0 0
3g scale-free random 〈k〉= 4 57.30 22.38 11.75 [.013, .013] 4.78 [.019, .017, .002, .001] 3.76 0.03
l.t. 63.00 22.81 7.30 [.013, .014] 6.35 [.024, .023, .002, .003] 0.54 0
3h 〈k〉= 8 63.70 29.53 1.37 [.005, .005] 3.84 [.010, .006, .002, .001] 1.43 0.13
l.t. 67.23 30.03 0.54 [.004, .006] 2.13 [.012, .007, .004, .004] 0.07 0
3i scale-free degree-rank 〈k〉= 4 30.31 37.00 5.54 [.014, .014] 14.62 [.064, .046, .003, .002] 10.76 1.77
l.t. 38.69 37.38 4.08 [.012, .014] 18.70 [.070, .047, .006, .004] 1.15 0
3j 〈k〉= 8 56.24 35.06 2.00 [.005, .002] 4.06 [.013, .014, .002, .001] 2.35 0.29
l.t. 59.48 36.35 0.29 [.006, .001] 3.76 [.016, .014, .005, .004] 0.12 0
S1a planar lattice random 50% 〈k〉= 4 12.25 12.50 3.25 [.271, .056] 10.13 [.300, .070, .002, .001] 38.37 23.50
S1b 〈k〉= 8 16.58 18.67 24.33 [.098, .090] 3.50 [.246, .074, .002, .001] 26.50 10.42
S1c single-scale random 〈k〉= 4 13.00 35.40 2.80 [.099, .148] 14.30 [.333, .085, .003, .002] 20.70 13.80
S1d 〈k〉= 8 0 52.00 1.00 [.351, 0] 19.50 [.377, .035, .002, .001] 7.00 20.50
S1e single-scale degree-rank 〈k〉= 4 64.05 5.72 4.67 [.756, .174] 5.06 [.570, .176, .003, .002] 12.50 8.00
S1f 〈k〉= 8 11.80 23.00 0.40 [.483, .127] 13.80 [.516, .044, .002, .001] 45.40 5.60
S1g scale-free random 〈k〉= 4 29.74 22.67 1.17 [.311, .280] 6.42 [.500, .118, .004, .003] 35.17 4.83
S1h 〈k〉= 8 39.88 17.67 0.56 [.427, .087] 5.89 [.397, .072, .002, .001] 33.11 2.89
S1i scale-free degree-rank 〈k〉= 4 19.60 10.20 40.10 [.861, .106] 21.30 [.940, .057, .002, .001] 7.00 1.80
S1j 〈k〉= 8 0.83 18.17 0.67 [.649, .126] 2.33 [.719, .216, .002, .001] 65.17 12.83
S2a ring lattice random 1% 〈k〉= 4 26.76 51.12 0 [–, –] 0 [–, –, –, –] 22.12 0
S2b random 50% 10.50 8.83 9.34 [.270, .096] 10.33 [.269, .123, .001, .001] 55.83 5.17
S2c complete random 1% 60.80 26.80 11.20 [.010, 0] 1.20 [.010, .000, .002, .001] 0 0
S2d random 50% 0 0 99.60 [.500, .000] 0.40 [.501, .001, .001 0] 0 0
S3a planar lattice random 1% ε = {−1,0, .5} 51.43 48.04 0.18 [.004 0] 0 [–, –, –, –] 0.35 0
S3b δ = {.025, .05, .1} 47.57 51.05 0.24 [.006 .003] 0 [–, –, –, –] 1.14 0
S3c single-scale random ε = {−1,0, .5} 64.96 27.12 3.32 [.004, .003] 2.80 [.009, .006, .001, .001] 1.80 0
S3d δ = {.025, .05, .1} 58.35 31.84 2.81 [.004, .002] 4.15 [.010, .008, .002, .001] 2.85 0
S3e single-scale degree-rank ε = {−1,0, .5} 60.16 29.74 2.63 [.005, .005] 3.68 [.013, .009, .002, .001] 3.58 0.21
S3f δ = {.025, .05, .1} 62.21 27.54 2.79 [.005, .004] 3.46 [.012, .009, .002, .001] 3.92 0.08
S3g scale-free random ε = {−1,0, .5} 46.80 30.09 13.37 [.012, .013] 5.47 [.019, .018, .001, .001] 4.27 0
S3h δ = {.025, .05, .1} 49.68 25.36 14.89 [.011, .011] 5.21 [.019, .019, .001, .001] 4.86 0
S3i scale-free degree-rank ε = {−1,0, .5} 32.93 33.36 6.14 [.020, .024] 14.71 [.057, .038, .002, .001] 11.50 1.36
S3j δ = {.025, .05, .1} 45.22 27.67 5.61 [.019, .027] 12.06 [.054, .038, .002, .001] 8.72 0.72
S4a planar lattice random pair 1% 〈k〉= 4 20.14 73.64 2.29 [.006, .002] 0.64 [.012, .008, .002, .001] 3.29 0
S4b 〈k〉= 8 46.69 53.25 0.03 [.004, 0] 0 [–, –, –, –] 0.03 0
S4c single-scale random pair 〈k〉= 4 27.42 47.50 8.83 [.006, .004] 9.92 [.012, .010, .002, .001] 6.04 0.29
S4d 〈k〉= 8 53.59 42.56 0.49 [.004, .002] 2.48 [.008, .007, .003, .002] 0.81 0.07
S4e scale-free random pair 〈k〉= 4 37.26 27.06 15.55 [.017, .019] 12.24 [.030, .029, .001, .001] 7.24 0.65
S4f 〈k〉= 8 42.48 38.12 2.08 [.005, .002] 11.60 [.012, .009, .002, .001] 5.32 0.40
S5a HK scale-free random 1% 〈k〉= 4 35.90 13.82 45.71 [.133, .230] 0.85 [.089, .164, .002, .001] 3.64 0.08
S5b 〈k〉= 8 53.17 42.63 1.14 [.004, .002] 2.40 [.009, .006, .002, .001] 0.66 0
S5c HK scale-free degree-rank 〈k〉= 4 41.23 10.97 34.69 [.524, .375] 4.80 [.270, .235, .002, .002] 8.14 0.17
S5d 〈k〉= 8 32.04 55.81 3.77 [.005, .003] 5.92 [.013, .017, .002, .001] 2.15 0.31
Table S4. Classifications of the simulations performed for rhC,min < r < r
h
C,max grouped by panel of Figs. 3 and S1–S5. For
each panel, the table reports the fractions of the six possible outcomes (all-C, all-D, stalemate, fluctuation, non-convergence
with positive/negative regression slope). To quantify stalemates and fluctuations, the table reports the mean and standard
deviation (〈C〉 and σC) of the average asymptotic C-level and, only for fluctuations, the mean and standard deviation (〈A〉
and σA) of the oscillation’s amplitude (the min-max excursion of the asymptotic C-level). To validate the classification, the
simulations of Fig. 3 have been extended over a ten-times longer timescale (5000/δ = 105 game rounds, the last 20% of which
used for the classification; see row label ‘l.t.’), showing no significant change.
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